Expression of Emotion in (Some of) the Arts
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Expression Of Emotion In (Some of) The Arts

A great deal has, and continues to be, written on the expression of emotion in the arts. It no longer seems plausible to define art as expression, but that it expresses emotion is still thought to be an important fact about art. This motivates inquiries into the nature of such expression. Usually such inquiries propose a common account for all the arts or limit themselves to the consideration of one art such as music.

The purpose of this paper is to argue that a common account of expression in art cannot be given. My strategy will be to make use of some recent philosophical work on the nature of the emotions to better understand what the expression of the emotions might be in various arts. Because I think the sharpest contrasts exist between literature and music, these are the arts I will concentrate on, although I will also say something about painting.

I. The Nature of Emotion

There is no one view about the nature of the emotions that is generally accepted in contemporary philosophy of mind. One way in which philosophers disagree concerns the "components" they take to be definitive of emotions. This disagreement, however, suggests a common picture: emotions are complex states of persons, the simpler parts of which are given by stating the "components." I will accept this picture here without assuming that it is ultimately the best way to think about emotion.

Georges Rey lists seven possible components of emotion: "the cognitive, the qualitative, the behavioral, the physiological, the contextual, the etiological, and the relational." Of the seven, the first three have traditionally dominated discussions of the emotions, and they also seem to have the most bearing on the concept of expression. It is with these that I will be concerned.

What Rey calls the cognitive I prefer to call the intentional component, because it consists not only of cognitive states such as beliefs and doubts but also noncognitive intentional states such as preferences and desires. For a wide range of emotions, the intentional component is essential and determines what kind of emotion is being suffered. For example, it is essential to grief that one believes one has suffered a loss. There are some emotions, however, about which it is not clear that an intentional component is essential. These are emotions that are sometimes said to exist without "objects." While some of these, like anxiety, are associated with neurosis and so may have a subconscious "object," others like joy and sadness certainly are not. One can feel joy or sadness without feeling these about anything in particular. Yet it is hard to imagine human joy or sadness in complete absense of joyful or sad thoughts. This suggests that, while it may be impossible to say which beliefs or desires are definitive of joy or sadness, it is still the case that an intentional component is essential to them.

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It is not clear how we are to distinguish the intentional components of a particular person’s emotional state from other elements of a person’s total intentional state at a given time. Suppose someone fears being attacked by a tiger. He believes tigers are dangerous and that there is one in the vicinity. He hates danger and the prospect of violent death. These beliefs and hates are certainly prime candidates for the intentional component of fear. But they might also plausibly be regarded as causes of fear. (It might be argued that these alternatives are not incompatible.\textsuperscript{4}) Suppose further that he has various fantasies about tiger attacks and that he remembers stories he has heard about man-eating tigers. Are these intentional components of his fear or further causes (since they might increase his fear) or effects (since they might be said to be fear-induced)? Finally, he forms intentions about what he would do given various contingencies. Can this plausibly be considered as an intentional component of his fear as well or only as a consequence? (Certainly not all these intentional states are essential components of his fear but it is not clear why all components have to be essential.) It is not necessary to answer these questions here. What is important is to recognize that there is a set of intentional states associated with a given individual emotional state which give that emotional state a complex character. I will call the sum total of these intentional states the intentional content of an emotion.

What Rey calls the qualitative component of emotion (about the reality of which he is skeptical) I prefer to simply call feeling. Not every time one fears that \( p \) does one suffer the emotion fear. (Consider fearing in the morning that it will rain in the afternoon.) It might be claimed that what accounts for this is that one suffers fear only if one feels something and one can fear that \( p \) without feeling anything.

Rey speaks of feelings as (possible) qualitative components of emotion because of their kinship with sensations or qualia. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries philosophers often identified emotions with feelings in this sense. The fact that we speak of feelings of grief and fear may seem to support this identification. However, while “feeling” can be used as a synonym of “emotion,” it no longer has the sense in which I have been using it. As has been widely pointed out, whatever may be going on in one’s breast,\textsuperscript{5} nothing can be grief if it lacks certain intentional elements. (I think the same is true for joy and sadness although the matter is less clear here.) It is also not clear that the feeling someone has when grief-stricken, i.e., the feeling components of one’s grief, is felt if and only if one is grief-stricken. Perhaps one can feel grief without feeling \( that \) and perhaps one can feel \( that \) without feeling grief. The most we can conclude is that possibly one suffers an emotion only if one feels something, but there seems to be no one-to-one correlation between a given feeling and a given emotion.

It is sometimes claimed that certain behavior is noncontingently related to certain emotions. However, it is doubtful that, if one feels a particular emotion, there is something in particular that one necessarily does. Flight is associated with fear but whether a person who is afraid actually flees depends among other things on what he fears, his beliefs and his character. Weeping is associated with grief but whether one weeps when one feel grief depends also on one’s beliefs (how one thinks one should behave) and one’s situation (whether one is alone or with others, in a public or private place) among other things.

This, however, does not show that no behavior is a component of emotion. We face the same problem we faced with some intentional states. Behavior might be regarded as a mere consequence of emotion, but it might be regarded as part of a larger emotional state. As with some intentional states, I am not sure how we can decide.

The upshot of the discussion is that intentional components are what typically make an emotion the kind it is. They are also, more than anything else, what creates the considerable variety and com-
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plextiy of human emotions even within a kind. Feeling and behavior may also be regarded as components of emotion. The fact that no particular feeling or behavior is necessarily connected to a given emotion also creates variety within kinds of emotion. The fact that some particular feelings and behaviors are nevertheless characteristic of certain emotions allows them to function as indicators of emotion.

The phenomenon of expression of emotion in art has something to do with all three components but not the same thing in all the arts.

II.

The preceding section emphasized the importance of an intentional ingredient in emotions. Their centrality may suggest that when we turn to expression of emotion in the arts, we might hope to find it in the expression of intentional content. However, most writers on the expression of emotion in art do not approach the subject in this way, though there are notable exceptions who will be mentioned later. The reason is probably that many arts seem utterly incapable of expressing intentional content of emotion. For example, instrumental music cannot do so though music is the art most often (though most controversially) associated with the expression of emotion.

That the conception of expression of emotion as the expression of intentional content of emotion is inapplicable to many arts has blinded philosophers to the fact that there is one art to which it applies very well, viz., to literature in all its forms and especially to lyric poetry. In the remainder of this section I will explain further what I mean by saying that, in literature, emotion is expressed by the expression of intentional content of emotion; I will also attempt to defend that claim.

Suppose I am angry with my friend and decide to have it out with him. I say, "How could you be so inconsiderate as to . . . . You know how important it is to me that . . . ." My words do not describe the beliefs and wishes that belong to the intentional ingredient of my anger. They express them. By expressing them, my friend will not simply know that I am angry but will come to know something about the determinate anger I am feeling. While he may not be able to tell from the words themselves that I am not only angry but that I feel angry, it may be betrayed by my voice and body.

Now consider Wordsworth's poem:

A slumber did my spirit seal;
I had no human fears:
She seemed a thing that could not feel
The touch of earthly years.

No motion has she now, no force;
She neither hears nor sees;
Roll'd round in earth's diurnal course
With rocks, and stones, and trees.

I do not claim that Wordsworth is expressing intentional ingredients of his sorrow. The speaker may be imaginary and the emotion imaginary as well. What seems perfectly clear to me is that the thought the poem expresses is to be identified as an intentional ingredient of the sorrow of the speaker. The expression of emotion in the poem at least in part consists in the articulation of the thought which gives the speaker's sorrow a determinate character. (I say "at least in part" to make room for the claim that in part it consists in how the thought is articulated, if this can really be distinguished from the articulation itself.)

"A Slumber did my Spirit Seal" is a paradigm of what I mean by the expression of emotion by the expression of intentional ingredients of it. However, this conception of expression also covers instances that might at first seem exceptions. F.R. Leavis6 contrasts Wordsworth's poem with one by Tennyson which begins:

Break, break, break,
On they cold grey stones, O Sea!
And I would that my tongue could utter
The thoughts that arise in me.

For the purposes of this discussion, Leavis's most important contrast concerns the relative inarticulateness of the
emotion in Tennyson's poem. The speaker here cannot find words that directly express his thoughts. So it might seem that, if emotion is expressed in the poem, as it clearly is, it is not done by expressing intentional ingredients. This seems to be Leavis's conclusion when he says that the poem offers emotion "directly." However, I disagree. Intentional content of the speaker's emotion is expressed in the poem and it is through it that emotion is expressed, just as in the Wordsworth poem. It is just that the intentional content is different. The intentional content of emotion in Tennyson's poem consists in attitudes toward the objects the speaker sees around him. Thus the poem proceeds:

O well for the fisherman's boy,
that shouts with his sister at play!
O well for the sailor lad,
that he sings on his boat on the bay!

The emotion is expressed through the objects picked out and his attitude toward them. He sees the sea breaking against rocks, a fisherman's boy playing with his sister, a sailor singing in his boat, stately ships going to harbor. Toward all but the first of these, his attitude is expressed by the words "O well" meaning that he can no longer share in these felicitous happenings or that it is well for those engaged in them in contrast with what is the case with him. On the other hand, the breaking of the waves he encourages or commands presumably because he sees his own life as monotonously breaking against his loss (the loss being referred to in the last two stanzas of the poem).

The emotions expressed in the two poems are very different even though both are emotions concerned with the death of a beloved. The different character of the emotions is determined by the different character of the intentional ingredients that are directly expressed in the poems.

The conception of expression I have been discussing does not cover every instance in which intentional content of emotion is articulated. Sometimes they are articulated by being described rather than expressed. This is what happens, for example, in the first chapter of *Anna Karenina*. There we learn about the thoughts, memories, wishes, etc. of Stephen Oblonsky which are intentional ingredients of the emotion he feels upon waking up from a particularly pleasant dream and then remembering the rift that took place with his wife three days before. Oblonsky himself does not (for the most part) express these thoughts and so neither is his emotion expressed. Rather we are informed of the thoughts and, by implication, the emotion, by the narrator.

I will speak of the articulation of an emotion whenever its intentional content is articulated. The kind of expression under discussion in this section is a species of articulation occurring only when articulation is in the first person, unmediated by a narrator.

It might be objected that my account of expression of emotion in literature fails to distinguish between the work expressing an emotion and a character in a work expressing an emotion. What I have been giving an account of, according to the objection, is the latter instead of the former. 7

I accept the distinction the objection proposes, but I doubt that it effects my basic point. If a complete poem articulates an emotion without irony or authorial comment, then not only does a "speaker" express an emotion but the poem does so as well. So the objection only shows that the criterion just given to distinguish expression from other forms of articulation of emotion in literature, viz., that the articulation be in the first person unmediated by a narrator, needs supplementation before it states a sufficient condition of expression. This I admit but I won't attempt to supplement it here. What seems to me important is that there be clear cases of the sort of expression I am talking about and that this sort of expression of emotion be recognized as a species of articulation of emotion.

I am not the first to think of the expression of emotion in literature as a species of articulation of emotion. I think Leavis is, at least, groping for such a notion al-
though, as we have seen, he takes too narrow a view of what articulation may consist in. John Casey presupposes such a conception when he tries to link sincerity in poetry to the adequacy with which an emotion is expressed. 8 What is more or less adequately expressed for Casey are intentional ingredients of emotions.

Perhaps the most famous precursor of the view I am advancing is Collingwood. Although Collingwood's conception of expression is difficult, what is certainly true is that for him, expression of an emotion is becoming clear about the nature or character of the emotion one is feeling. Collingwood's first example of this sort of expression is precisely an instance of what I have called articulating the intentional content: "This activity has something to do with the thing we call language: he expresses himself by speaking. It also has something to do with consciousness: the emotion expressed is an emotion of whose nature the person who feels it is no longer unconscious." 9

I would not claim that all instances of articulating an emotion are instances of becoming clear about an emotion. Collingwood also differs from me in claiming the emotion expressed in art is always the artist's. The most important difference between Collingwood and me is that Collingwood takes expression, in the sense under discussion, as definitive of all art properly so called. For me, expression as it is found in literature not only is not definitive of art but is not even found in many arts.

III. Music

Among those writing about music, no one has recognized the existence of intentional ingredients of emotion more clearly than Eduard Hanslick. Thus, "only by virtue of ideas and judgments—unconscious though they may be when our feeling runs high—can an indefinite state of mind pass into a definite feeling." 10 Since Hanslick identified the expression of emotion with the representation of the intentional content of an emotion, he denied that instrumental music expresses emotion. What is certainly true is that music does not articulate emotions and so does not express them in the same way that literature does.

It seems to me unneccessarily paradoxical to simply deny that music expresses emotion. The question should be: what is asserted when we say that music expresses emotion.

I will consider two accounts of continuing popularity of what we are saying when we assert that a musical work, or a part of it, expresses emotion. (i) To say the music expresses an emotion (e.g., sadness) is to say that the music has an expressive property (e.g., sadness) distinct from but denoted by the same word as denotes the property people have of being in a certain emotional state (e.g., the state of being sad). 11 (ii) To say the music expresses an emotion is to say that it affects us in a certain way. However, (ii) may be further specified in one of two ways. (iia) To say the music expresses an emotion (e.g., sadness) is to assert that we hear the emotion (sadness) in the music or that we hear the music as (sad); 12 (iib) To say the music expresses an emotion (e.g., sadness) is to say the music makes us feel that emotion (feel sad). 13

I am not concerned whether any one of these accounts tells us what we are saying whenever we assert that music expresses an emotion. All I am concerned with is whether one or another of these accounts is sometimes true.

Of the three accounts, (iia) has a special place. 14 As an account of what we are saying when we say that music expresses emotion (iia) may be too obscure to be satisfactory. I suggest, however, that it is the phenomenon of hearing emotion in music that is our basic reason for saying that music expresses emotion. It might be said in reply that (iib) also mentions a basic fact of musical experience and one far less mysterious than the one (I claim) is mentioned in (iia), viz., that music makes us feel emotion. This certainly is a fact of musical experience; however, it is not clear why it by itself should lead us to say that music expresses emotion. Outside of
aesthetics, the mere fact that something makes us feel sad never leads us to say that it expresses sadness or, for that matter, that it is itself sad. The idea of expressing something is intimately related to the idea of showing something forth. Unless emotion is more closely related to the music itself than (iib) has it, it is hard to see what justification there would be for talking of expression at all.

I think it is better to think of (iib), as well as (i), as attempts to explicate the obscure fact mentioned in (iia). It is not clear what we are claiming when we claim to hear sadness in music or music as sad. We certainly are not hearing the emotional state that people who are sad feel. (i) suggests that hearing music as sad is hearing (or seeming to hear) an expressive property of the music, viz., the expressive property sadness (not to be confused with the emotional state sadness). A proponent of (iib) might suggest that hearing the music as sad might consist in hearing certain "nonexpressive" properties of music such as melody and this making us feel sad. However, we can hear music as sad, without feeling sad, from which we can conclude that (iib) may be dismissed out of hand. The fact that we are moved by music is neither what musical expression consists in nor part of the analysis of what it consists in. Let us concentrate instead on the question whether (i) provides a satisfactory explanation of the fundamental fact mentioned in (iia). To do so I will examine one recent account of expressive properties which reveals the problems with the claim that such properties exist.

According to Alan Tormey, a set of nonexpressive properties like tempo, dynamics, harmonic texture, and melodic contour are "wholly constitutive of" the expressive properties of a musical work. Tormey adds the following two caveats: first, having this set of nonexpressive properties is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for having the expressive property. Second, the very same set of nonexpressive properties may wholly constitute in the same work another, indeed several other, expressive properties. Both caveats might be summed up by saying that nonexpressive properties ambiguously constitute expressive properties.

Two thoughts seem to underlie Tormey's account of expressive properties. Regarding the main point that nonexpressive properties constitute expressive properties, there is the thought that if we are trying to explain our experience of hearing a musical work as sad, we would of course not do so by mentioning that it has, after all, the expressive property of sadness. We would point to various nonexpressive properties. Regarding the caveats, there is the thought that different people, or even the same person, may hear different emotions in music by virtue of hearing the very same nonexpressive properties of the music. It is hard to be sure that this is true because it would be hard to delimit precisely what properties are heard and which are responsible for hearing emotion in music. However, if we recall that there is no behavior or facial expression essentially tied to the expression of peoples' emotional states nor any definite feelings essential to those emotional states, and that the same behavior, facial expression or feeling may belong, at different times, to distinct emotional states, then it seems likely that the nonexpressive properties we hear in music are not likely to be exclusively tied to a single emotion either.

Since both these thoughts are plausible, Tormey's analysis is well motivated. I, however, have my doubts whether the notion of one (set of) properties ambiguously constituting another (set of) properties is coherent. I am not sure what it means to say that one property (or set of properties) $F$ wholly constitutes a property $G$ if $x$'s being $F$ is not at least sufficient for $x$'s being $G$. Even supposing we can understand this however, the second caveat, that the same set of nonexpressive properties may at the same time in the same work wholly constitute several expressive properties, remains paradoxical. If $A$ constitutes $B$ and $A$ constitutes $C$ and $B$ and $C$ are of the same logical type, then $B$ is $C$. (If I have a piece of wood that serves as an axe handle and, being detachable,
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also serves as a wedge handle, the axe handle is the wedge handle.)

If this criticism is correct, we can draw the following conclusions: (1) we need only refer to nonexpressive properties of a musical work in trying to pinpoint the properties of it in virtue of which we hear it as sad; (2) we might have heard the music as \( F \) (where hearing it as \( F \) is hearing an emotion in the music other than sadness) by virtue of hearing the same nonexpressive properties; (3) it is paradoxical to say that the very same nonexpressive properties constitute in the same work different expressive properties.

Given (1) - (3), a plausible further conclusion is that we are on clearer, less paradoxical ground if we simply stick with (iia) than if we move from (iia) to (i) contrary to the original intuition that (i) might be useful in explaining what (iia) says.

It may be possible to revise Tormey’s account to avoid this conclusion. While the notion of ambiguous constitution is paradoxical, the notion of ambiguous symbolization is both familiar and legitimate. If nonexpressive properties can be regarded as symbols of emotional states, it is plausible to suppose that such symbols would often be ambiguous among several states. Further, we could say that a work has the expressive property \( p \) (e.g., sadness) just in case it symbolizes the corresponding emotional state (e.g., sadness). Such a view is plausible, however, only if it can explain how nonexpressive properties symbolize emotional states. I leave this problem to proponents of expressive properties.

My own view is that it is better to dispense with the notion of expressive properties altogether. While I am not in a position to give an alternative analysis of (iia) to replace (i), I would suggest that the most plausible approach for such an analysis would be to regard hearing emotion in music as a quasi-perceptual, quasi-imaginative activity. Thus, R. K. Elliot has suggested that when we hear emotion in music, we sometimes hear the music as analogous to a voice expressing emotion, a “voice” that may seem to come from without or from within us.\(^{17}\) In general, such imaginative quasi-perception involved in hearing emotion in music is probably best regarded as a species of the phenomena known as aspect perception. When I look at an old wall and see a landscape it it, the surface of the stone composing the wall is not constitutive of the property of either being or representing a landscape. Having that surface needn’t even give the wall the property of resembling a landscape. Rather, we imagine we are looking at a distant view, that a crack is a river, etc., and see it as we imagine it. No doubt there are very important disanalogies between this and hearing emotion in music, but one common factor always present is an imaginative contribution on the part of the listener/spectator.\(^{18}\)

While I won’t offer an analysis of what (iia) says, something more can be said to explain the phenomena of hearing emotion in music. In fact, precisely the same facts sometimes adduced to explain the existence of expressive properties can be adduced to explain why we hear emotion in music. These facts include similarities between people’s behavior when in emotional states, or people’s feeling when in those states, and dynamic properties of music. One should also mention certain musical conventions tying music to emotion such as the idea that certain keys are peculiarly suited to certain feelings. I would add that the similarities first mentioned are operative because people expect to hear emotion in music. No doubt there are many other relevant facts as well.

Before concluding this section let me consider one further reason that might be given for (i). Just as we want to distinguish the claim that a painting represents a so-and-so from the claim that someone sees a so-and-so in the painting or sees the painting as representing a so-and-so, we also want to distinguish the claim that a musical work is sad from the claim that someone hears the music as sad. It might be claimed that we need (i) to make the distinction.

I certainly grant that we need such a distinction in the case of painting. Some-
one might see a Mondrian painting as representing a tablecloth, but it does not. However, I am not sure that the distinction carries over to music or that, even if it does, we are therefore committed to (i).

Questions about what a painting represents seem able to be settled in ways in which questions about what emotion a musical work expresses are not. However, some claims about the latter are justified while others are based on misperceptions or misconceptions. This fact does not imply that there are such things as expressive properties. If someone hears a work as sad because he misperceives it, then the work is not sad and it does not express sadness. It remains an open question whether this is analyzed in terms of the music’s lacking an expressive property. My argument has been that if (1) - (3) are true, we are better off with an analysis in other terms.

Even if I am wrong about (i), it should be clear that expression of emotion in music is a very different sort of thing than expression of emotion in literature. To be sure we can call poems sad just as we can call music sad. But the way in which a poem can express sadness that critics have found to be especially important is simply not open to a work of instrumental music.

IV. Painting

I will more briefly say something about expression of emotion in painting since the phenomenon here differs from both literature and music, though there are similarities with both.

If we say a painting is sad, one thing we could mean is that it has a sad subject. If so, we could just as well have said that the painting represents a sad person or scene. Philosophers disagree whether it would also be right to speak of the painting as expressing sadness in this case. I am quite happy to say that a painting does not express sadness simply by virtue of representing a sad person or even by virtue of representing a person expressing sadness. What seems to me important to realize, however, is that in undisputed cases of expression of emotion in painting, we can often substitute the “language” of representation for the “language” of expression. Suppose a painting represents pride and expresses horror-at-pride. Insofar as this attitude is incorporated into the painting, it is done through what the painting represents, i.e. by representing pride as horrible.19 Whether or not one talks of an expressive property of horror, what is important for my purposes is to realize that the phenomenon in question is different from the phenomenon of musical expression. The musical phenomenon cannot be described in the language of representation.

This may suggest that expression of emotion in painting is more like that found in literature than in music. Expression in literature consists in the articulation of (often imaginary) intentional contents of (often imaginary) emotions. This may sometimes occur in painting. One possible case is where a painting can be seen as a visualization of the contents of someone’s mind as the monsters/demons of Grunewald’s Temptation of St. Anthony might be seen. A somewhat different case, and one more plausibly called “expression,” is where a painting symbolizes a state of mind.20 Van Gogh’s last painting is of a corn field traversed by paths leading nowhere under a sky filled with ravens. The ominous sky, and the paths that come to a dead end, are symbols of a sense of entrapment. Here if anywhere in painting it can be said that the expression of emotion is accomplished through the expression of its intentional content.

However, expression in painting is typically as unlike expression in literature as it is unlike music. In a sense it is intermediate between literature and music. In expressing emotion, painting, like music, often exploits behavioral components of emotion. But rather than offer analogies for those components, painting can represent them. I do not mean to deny, however, that expression in painting can also work on the level of analogy, in which case its expression would be much like music’s.
In the course of trying to identify the expression of emotion in literature, music, and painting, I have discussed a number of theories that have sometimes been proposed as general theories of artistic expression. Some I have rejected, viz., the views labeled (i) and (iia) in section III. (These were stated there as accounts of expression of emotion in music but it is obvious how they can be generalized.) Other theories I have claimed to have limited application. Thus I have claimed that a modified version of Collingwood’s expression theory applies to literature and possibly sometimes painting but not at all to instrumental music. While I would not claim that (iia) of section III is a theory of musical expression, I think it identifies the most important phenomena that can be regarded as the expression of emotion in music. In painting there are a number of phenomena equally deserving to be called expression of emotion. (I do not claim to have mentioned everything in music and in literature that we might think of as the expression of emotion, only the most important things.)

If my conclusions so far are correct, then we have found two things to support my main thesis that different arts require different accounts of expression of emotion, viz. (1) expressive phenomena differ in different arts; (2) none of the theories so far considered are true general theories of expression of emotion in art.

Of course it is still possible that there is a true general theory that unifies the diverse phenomena. I do not know how to argue that there could not be such a theory, but if it exists already I am not aware of it.

I will conclude with one reservation about my own approach and one qualification of my main thesis. The reservation concerns the fact that I have confined the discussion to the expression of emotion. This was the result of my strategy of trying to understand expression of emotion in the arts by first understanding what emotions are. One unfortunate consequence of this is that it leaves out of account entirely the many other things that are expressible in the arts. This raises the possibility that I failed to find a unified theory because my approach was too narrow. We looked for a theory of artistic expression of emotion while we should have looked for a theory of artistic expression. I am inclined to think that if we broaden our inquiry to include other things that art can express, the diversity of expressive phenomena will simply appear greater. But I have done and will do nothing to show this, and I do not consider the question closed.

My main thesis is that we need different accounts of expression of emotion for different arts. The qualification concerns what an account may consist in. The thesis might suggest that, while there is no unified theory of expression of emotion in art, there are unified theories of expression of emotion for individual arts. However, this may not be so. There may be a range of expressive phenomena even in individual arts. An account of expression of emotion in an artwork may consist of a description of the range of expressive phenomena in that art rather than a theory of expression.

1 I am not the first to use this strategy. Two places where its use is given particular importance are: Roger Scruton, Art and Imagination (London, 1974) and Alan Tormey, The Concept of Expression (Princeton University Press, 1971). Because my conclusions differ considerably from Tormey’s, part of section III is devoted to a criticism of his views.
3 For a fuller discussion of the possible contents of objectless emotions or moods, see W. Charlton, Aesthetics (Hutchinson University Library, 1970), pp. 89-90.
7 Tormey, pp. 137-40.


12 Scruton, pp. 121-33.


14 Peter Kivy’s recent book, *The Corded Shell* (Princeton University Press, 1980) seems to take as its starting point the special place of (iiia). However, unlike me, he seems to want to analyze (iiia) in terms of (i). For my reasons for not doing so, see below.


16 Tormey, pp. 127-33.


19 For a fuller discussion of this sort of expression, see Guy Sircello on “artistic acts” in *Mind and Art* (Princeton University Press, 1972), chapter 1.

20 For a discussion of “symbol” in the sense I am using it, see Scruton, pp. 227-39.