An Essay in Aesthetics

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A certain painter, not without some reputation at the present day, once wrote a little book on the art he practises, in which he gave a definition of that art so succinct that I take it as a point of departure for this essay.

“The art of painting,” says that eminent authority, “is the art of imitating solid objects upon a flat surface by means of pigments.” It is delightfully simple, but prompts the question—Is that all? And, if so, what a deal of unnecessary fuss has been made about it. Now, it is useless to deny that our modern writer has some very respectable authorities behind him. Plato, indeed, gave a very similar account of the affair, and himself put the question—is it then worth while? And, being scrupulously and relentlessly logical, he decided that it was not worth while, and proceeded to turn the artists out of his ideal republic. For all that, the world has continued obstinately to consider that painting was worth while, and though, indeed, it has never quite made up its mind as to what, exactly, the graphic arts did for it, it has persisted in honouring and admiring its painters.

Can we arrive at any conclusions as to the nature of the graphic arts, which will at all explain our feelings about them, which will at least put them into some kind of relation with the other arts, and not leave us in the extreme perplexity, engendered by any theory of mere imitation? For, I suppose, it must be admitted that if imitation is the sole purpose of the graphic arts, it is surprising that the works of such arts are ever looked upon as more than curiosities, or ingenious toys, are ever taken seriously by grown-up people. Moreover, it will be surprising that they have no recognisable affinity with other arts, such as music or architecture, in which the imitation of actual objects is a negligible quantity.

To form such conclusions is the aim I have put before myself in this essay. Even if the results are not decisive, the inquiry may lead us to a view of the graphic arts that will not be altogether unfruitful.

I must begin with some elementary psychology, with a consideration of the nature of instincts. A great many objects in the world, when presented to our senses, put in motion a complex nervous machinery, which ends in some instinctive appropriate action. We see a wild bull in a field; quite without our conscious interference a nervous process goes on, which, unless we interfere forcibly, ends in the appropriate reaction of flight. The nervous mechanism which results in flight causes a certain state of consciousness, which we call the emotion of fear. The whole of animal life, and a great part of human life, is made up of these instinctive reactions to sensible objects, and their accompanying emotions. But man has the peculiar faculty of calling up again in his mind the echo of past experiences of this kind, of going over it again, “in imagination” as we say. He has, therefore, the possibility of a double life; one the actual life, the other the imaginative life. Between these two lives there is this great distinction, that in the actual life the processes of natural selection have brought it about that the instinctive reaction, such, for instance, as flight from danger, shall be the important part of the whole process, and it is towards this that the man bends his whole conscious endeavor. But in the imaginative life no such action is necessary, and, therefore, the whole consciousness may be focussed upon the perceptive and the emotional aspects of the experience. In this way we get, in the imaginative life, a different set of values, and a different kind of perception.

We can get a curious side glimpse of the nature of this imaginative life from the cinematograph. This resembles actual life in almost every respect, except that what the psychologists call the conative part of our reaction to sensations, that is to say, the appropriate resultant action is cut off. If, in a cinematograph, we see a runaway horse and cart, we do not have to think either of getting out of the way or heroically interposing ourselves. The result is that in the first place we see the event much more clearly; see a number of quite interesting but irrelevant things, which in real life could not struggle into our consciousness, bent, as it would be, entirely upon the problem of our appropriate reaction. I remember seeing in a cinematograph the arrival of a train at a foreign station and the people descending from the carriages; there was no platform, and to my intense surprise I saw several people turn right round after reaching the ground, as though to orientate themselves; an almost ridiculous performance, which I had never noticed in all the many hundred occasions on which such a scene had passed before my eyes in real life. The fact being that at a station one is never really a spectator of events, but an actor engaged in the drama of luggage or prospective seats, and one actually sees only so much as may help to the appropriate action.

In the second place, with regard to the visions of the cinematograph, one notices that whatever emotions are aroused by them, though they are likely to be weaker than those of ordinary life, are presented more clearly to the consciousness. If the scene presented be one of an accident, our pity and horror, though weak, since we know that no one is really hurt, are felt quite purely, since they cannot, as they would in life, pass at once into actions of assistance.

A somewhat similar effect to that of the cinematograph can be obtained by watching a mirror in which a street scene is reflected. If we look at the street itself we are almost sure to adjust ourselves in some way to its actual
existence. We recognise an acquaintance, and wonder why he looks so dejected this morning, or become interested in a new fashion in hats—the moment we do that the spell is broken, we are reacting to life itself in however slight a degree, but, in the mirror, it is easier to abstract ourselves completely, and look upon the changing scene as a whole. It then, at once, takes on the visionary quality, and we become true spectators, not selecting what we will see, but seeing everything equally, and thereby we come to notice a number of appearances and relations of appearances, which would have escaped our notice before, owing to that perpetual economising by selection of what impressions we will assimilate, which in life we perform by unconscious processes. The frame of the mirror, then, does to some extent turn the reflected scene from one that belongs to our actual life into one that belongs rather to the imaginative life. The frame of the mirror makes its surface into a very rudimentary work of art, since it helps us to attain to the artistic vision. For that is what, as you will already have guessed, I have been coming to all this time, namely that the work of art is intimately connected with the secondary imaginative life, which all men live to a greater or less extent.

That the graphic arts are the expression of the imaginative life rather than a copy of actual life might be guessed from observing children. Children, if left to themselves, never, I believe, copy what they see, never, as we say, “draw from nature,” but express, with a delightful freedom and sincerity, the mental images which make up their own imaginative lives.

Art, then, is an expression and a stimulus of this imaginative life, which is separated from actual life by the absence of responsive action. Now this responsive action implies in actual life moral responsibility. In art we have no such moral responsibility—it presents a life freed from the binding necessities of our actual existence.

What then is the justification for this life of the imagination which all human beings live more or less fully? To the pure moralist, who accepts nothing but ethical values, in order to be justified, it must be shown not only not to hinder but actually to forward right action, otherwise it is not only useless but, since it absorbs our energies, positively harmful. To such a one two views are possible, one the Puritanical view at Its narrowest, which regards the life of the imagination as no better or worse than a life of sensual pleasure, and therefore entirely reprehensible. The other view is to argue that the imaginative life does subserve morality. And this is inevitably the view taken by moralists like Ruskin, to whom the imaginative life is yet an absolute necessity. It is a view which leads to some very hard special pleading, even to a self-deception which is in itself morally undesirable.

But here comes in the question of religion, for religion is also an affair of the imaginative life, and, though it claims to have a direct effect upon conduct, I do not suppose that the religious person if he were wise would justify religion entirely by its effect on morality, since that, historically speaking, has not been by any means uniformly advantageous. He would probably say that the religious experience was one which corresponded to certain spiritual capacities of human nature, the exercise of which is in itself good and desirable apart from their effect upon actual life. And so, too, I think the artist might if he chose take a mystical attitude, and declare that the fullness and completeness of the imaginative life he leads may correspond to an existence more real and more important than any that we know of in mortal life.

And in saying that, his appeal would find a sympathetic echo in most minds, for most people would, I think, say that the pleasures derived from art were of an altogether different character and more fundamental than merely sensual pleasures, that they did exercise some faculties which are felt to belong to whatever part of us there may be which is not entirely ephemeral and material.

It might even be that from this point of view we should rather justify actual life by its relation to the imaginative, justify nature by its likeness to art. I mean this, that since the imaginative life comes in the course of time to represent more or less what mankind feels to be the completest expression of its own nature, the freest use of its innate capacities, the actual life may be explained and justified by its approximation here and there, however partially and inadequately, to that freer and fuller life.

Before leaving this question of the justification of art, let me put it in another way. The imaginative life of a people has very different levels at different times, and these levels do not always correspond with the general level of the morality of actual life. Thus in the thirteenth century we read of barbarity and cruelty which would shock even us; we may, I think, admit that our moral level, our general humanity is decidedly higher to-day, but the level of our imaginative life is incomparably lower; we are satisfied there with a grossness, a sheer barbarity and squalor which would have shocked the thirteenth century profoundly. Let us admit the moral gain gladly, but do we not also feel a loss; do we not feel that the average businessman would be in every way a more admirable, more respectable being if his imaginative life were not so squalid and incoherent? And, if we admit any loss then, there is some function in human nature other than a purely ethical one, which is worthy of exercise.

Now the imaginative life has its own history both in the race and in the individual. In the individual life one of the first effects of freeing experience from the necessities of appropriate responsive action is to indulge recklessly the emotion of self-aggrandisement. The day-dreams of a child are filled with extravagant romances in which he is always the invincible hero. Music—which of all the arts supplies the strongest stimulus to the imaginative life, and
at the same time has the least power of controlling its
direction—music, at certain stages of people’s lives, has
the effect merely of arousing in an almost absurd degree
this egoistic elation, and Tolstoy appears to believe that
this is its only possible effect. But with the teaching of
experience and the growth of character the imaginative
life comes to respond to other instincts and to satisfy other
desires, until, indeed, it reflects the highest aspirations
and the deepest aversions of which human nature is
capable.

In dreams and when under the influence of drugs the
imaginative life passes out of our own control, and in
such cases its experiences may be highly undesirable, but
whenever it remains under our own control it must always
be on the whole a desirable life. That is not to say that it is
always pleasant, for it is pretty clear that mankind is so
constituted as to desire much besides pleasure, and we
shall meet among the great artists, the great exponents,
that is, of the imaginative life, many to whom the merely
pleasant is very rarely a part of what is desirable. But this
desirability of the imaginative life does distinguish it very
sharply from actual life, and is the direct result of that first
fundamental difference, its freedom from necessary
external conditions. Art, then, is, if I am right, the chief
organ of the imaginative life; it is by art that it is
stimulated and controlled within us, and, as we have seen,
the imaginative life is distinguished by the greater
clearness of its perception, and the greater purity and
freedom of its emotion.

First with regard to the greater clearness of perception.
The needs of our actual life are so imperative, that the
sense of vision becomes highly specialised in their
service. With an admirable economy we learn to see only
so much as is needful for our purposes; but this is in fact
very little, just enough to recognize and identify each
object or person; that done, they go into an entry in our
mental catalogue and are no more really seen. In actual
life the normal person really only reads the labels as it
were on the objects around him and troubles no further.
Almost all the things which are useful in any way put on
more or less this cap of invisibility. It is only when an
object exists in our lives for no other purpose than to be
seen that we really look at it, as for instance at a China
ornament or a precious stone, and towards such even the
most normal person adopts to some extent the artistic
attitude of pure vision abstracted from necessity.

Now this specialization of vision goes so far that ordinary
people have almost no idea of what things really look
like, so that oddly enough the one standard that popular
criticism applies to painting, namely, whether it is like
nature or not, is one which most people are, by the whole
tenour of their lives, prevented from applying properly.
The only things they have ever really looked at being
other pictures; the moment an artist who has looked at
nature brings to them a clear report of something
definitely seen by him, they are wildly indignant at its
untruth to nature. This has happened so constantly in our
own time that there is no need to prove it. One instance
will suffice. Monet is an artist whose chief claim to
recognition lies in the fact of his astonishing power of
faithfully reproducing certain aspects of nature, but his
really naïve innocence and sincerity were taken by the
public to be the most audacious humbug, and it required
the teaching of men like Bastien-Lepage, who cleverly
compromised between the truth and an accepted
convention of what things looked like, to bring the world
gradually round to admitting truths which a single walk in
the country with purely unbiased vision would have
established beyond doubt.

But though this clarified sense perception which we
discover in the imaginative life is of great interest, and
although it plays a larger part in the graphic arts than in
any other, it might perhaps be doubted whether,
interesting, curious, fascinating as it is, this aspect of the
imaginative life would ever by itself make art of profound
importance to mankind. But it is different, I think, with
the emotional aspect. We have admitted that the emotions
of the imaginative are generally weaker than those of
actual life. The picture of a saint being slowly flayed
alive, revolting as it is, will not produce the same physical
sensations of sickening disgust that a modern man would
feel if he could assist at the actual event; but they have a
compensating clearness of presentment to the
consciousness. The more poignant emotions of actual life
have, I think, a kind of numbing effect analogous to the
paralyzing influence of fear in some animals; but even if
this experience be not generally admitted, all will admit
that the need for responsive action hurries us along and
prevents us from ever realising fully what the emotion is
that we feel, from coordinating it perfectly with other
states. In short, the motives we actually experience are too
close to us to enable us to feel them clearly. They are in a
sense unintelligible. In the imaginative life, on the
contrary, we can both feel the emotion and watch it.
When we are really moved at the theatre we are always
both on the stage and in the auditorium.

Yet another point about the emotions of the imaginative
life—since they require no responsive action we can give
them a new valuation. In real life we must to some extent
cultivate those emotions which lead to useful action, and
we are bound to appraise emotions according to the
resultant action. So that, for instance, the feelings of
rivalry and emulation do get an encouragement which
perhaps they scarcely deserve, whereas certain feelings
which appear to have a high intrinsic value get almost no
stimulus in actual life. For instance, those feelings to
which the name of the cosmic emotion has been
somewhat unhappily given find almost no place in life,
but, since they seem to belong to certain very deep
springs of our nature, do become of great importance in
the arts.
Morality, then, appreciates emotion by the standard of resultant action. Art appreciates emotion in and for itself.

This view of the essential importance in art of the expression of the emotions is the basis of Tolstoy’s marvellously original and yet perverse and even exasperating book, “What is Art?” and I willingly confess, while disagreeing with almost all his results, how much I owe to him.

He gives an example of what he means by calling art the means of communicating emotions. He says, let us suppose a boy to have been pursued in the forest by a bear. If he returns to the village and merely states that he was pursued by a bear and escaped, that is ordinary language, the means of communicating facts or ideas; but if he describes his state first of heedlessness, then of sudden alarm and terror as the bear appears, and finally of relief when he gets away, and describes this so that his hearers share his emotions, then his description is a work of art.

Now in so far as the boy does this in order to urge the villagers to go out and kill the bear, though he may be using artistic methods, his speech is not a pure work of art; but if of a winter evening the boy relates his experience for the sake of the enjoyment of his adventure in retrospect, or better still, if he makes up the whole story for the sake of the imagined emotions, then his speech becomes a pure work of art. But Tolstoy takes the other view, and values the emotions aroused by art entirely for their reaction upon actual life, a view which he courageously maintains even when it leads him to condemn the whole of Michelangelo, Raphael and Titian, and most of Beethoven, not to mention nearly everything he himself has written, as bad or false art.

Such a view would, I think, give pause to any less heroic spirit. He would wonder whether mankind could have always been so radically wrong about a function that, whatever its value be, is almost universal. And in point of fact he will have to find some other word to denote what we now call art. Nor does Tolstoy’s theory even carry him safely through his own book, since, in his examples of morally desirable and therefore good art, he has to admit that these are to be found, for the most part, among works of inferior quality. Here, then, is at once the tacit admission that another standard than morality is applicable. We must therefore give up the attempt to judge the work of art by its reaction on life, and consider it as an expression of emotions regarded as ends in themselves. And this brings us back to the idea we had already arrived at, of art as the expression of the imaginative life.

If, then, an object of any kind is created by man not for use, for its fitness to actual life, but as an object of art, an object subserving the imaginative life, what will its qualities be? It must in the first place be adapted to that disinterested intensity of contemplation, which we have found to be the effect of cutting off the responsive action. It must be suited to that heightened power of perception which we found to result therefrom.

And the first quality that we demand in our sensations will be order, without which our sensations will be troubled and perplexed, and the other quality will be variety, without which they will not be fully stimulated.

It may be objected that many things in nature, such as flowers, possess these two qualities of order and variety in a high degree, and these objects do undoubtedly stimulate and satisfy that clear disinterested contemplation which is characteristic of the aesthetic attitude. But in our reaction to a work of art there is something more—there is the consciousness of purpose, the consciousness of a peculiar relation of sympathy with the man who made this thing in order to arouse precisely the sensations we experience. And when we come to the higher works of art, where sensations are so arranged that they arouse in us deep emotions, this feeling of a special tie with the man who expressed them becomes very strong. We feel that he has expressed something which was latent in us all the time, but which we never realised, that he has revealed us to ourselves in revealing himself. And this recognition of purpose is, I believe, an essential part of the aesthetic judgment proper.

The perception of purposeful order and variety in an object gives us the feeling which we express by saying that it is beautiful, but when by means of sensations our emotions are aroused we demand purposeful order and variety in them also, and if this can only be brought about by the sacrifice of sensual beauty we willingly overlook its absence.

Thus, there is no excuse for a china pot being ugly, there is every reason why Rembrandt’s and Degas’ pictures should be, from the purely sensual point of view, supremely and magnificently ugly.

This, I think, will explain the apparent contradiction between two distinct uses of the word beauty, one for that which has sensuous charm, and one for the aesthetic approval of works of imaginative art where the objects presented to us are often of extreme ugliness. Beauty in the former sense belongs to works of art where only the perceptual aspect of the imaginative life is exercised, beauty in the second sense becomes as it were supersensual, and is concerned with the appropriateness and intensity of the emotions aroused. When these emotions are aroused in a way that satisfies fully the needs of the imaginative life we approve and delight in the sensations through which we enjoy that heightened experience because they possess purposeful order and variety in relation to those emotions.

One chief aspect of order in a work of art is unity; unity of some kind is necessary for our restful contemplation of the work of art as a whole, since if it lacks unity we
cannot contemplate it in its entirety, but we shall pass
outside it to other things necessary to complete its unity.

In a picture this unity is due to a balancing of the
attractions of the eye about the central line of the picture.
The result of this balance of attractions is that the eye
rests willingly within the bounds of the picture. Dr.
Denman Ross of Harvard University has made a most
valuable study of the elementary considerations upon
which this balance is based in his “Theory of Pure
Design.” He sums up his results in the formula that a
composition is of value in proportion to the number of
orderly connections which it displays.

Dr. Ross wisely restricts himself to the study of abstract
and meaningless forms. The moment representation is
introduced forms have an entirely new set of values. Thus
a line which indicated the sudden bend of a head in a
certain direction would have far more than its mere value
as line in the composition because of the attraction which
a marked gesture has for the eye. In almost all paintings
this disturbance of the purely decorative values by reason
of the representative effect takes place, and the problem
becomes too complex for geometrical proof.

This merely decorative unity is, moreover, of very
different degrees of intensity in different artists and in
different periods. The necessity for a closely woven
geometrical texture in the composition is much greater in
heroic and monumental design than in genre pieces on a
small scale.

It seems also probable that our appreciation of unity in
pictorial design is of two kinds. We are so accustomed to
consider only the unity which results from the balance of
a number of attractions presented to the eye
simultaneously in a framed picture that we forget the
possibility of other pictorial forms.

In certain Chinese paintings the length is so great that we
cannot take in the whole picture at once, nor are we
intended to do so. Sometimes a landscape is painted upon
a roll of silk so long that we can only look at it in
successive segments. As we unroll it at one end and roll it
up at the other we traverse wide stretches of country,
tracing, perhaps, all the vicissitudes of a river from its
source to the sea, and yet, when this is well done, we have
received a very keen impression of pictorial unity.

Such a successive unity is of course familiar to us in
literature and music, and it plays its part in the graphic
arts. It depends upon the forms being presented to us in
such a sequence that each successive element is felt to
have a fundamental and harmonious relation with that
which preceded it. I suggest that in looking at drawings
our sense of pictorial unity is largely of this nature; we
feel, if the drawing be a good one, that each modulation
of the line as our eye passes along it gives order and
variety to our sensations. Such a drawing may be almost
entirely lacking in the geometrical balance which we are
accustomed to demand in paintings, and yet have, in a
remarkable degree, unity.

Let us now see how the artist passes from the stage of
merely gratifying our demand for sensuous order and
variety to that where he arouses our emotions. I will call
the various methods by which this is effected the
emotional elements of design.

The first element is that of the rhythm of the line with
which the forms are delineated.

The drawn line is the record of a gesture, and that gesture
is modified by the artist’s feeling which is thus
communicated to us directly.

The second element is mass. When an object is so
represented that we recognize it as having inertia we feel
its power of resisting movement, or communicating its
own movement to other bodies, and our imaginative
reaction to such an image is governed by our experience
of mass in actual life.

The third element is space. The same-sized square on two
pieces of paper can be made by very simple means to
appear to represent either a cube two or three inches high,
or a cube of hundreds of feet, and our reaction to it is
proportionately changed.

The fourth element is that of light and shade. Our feelings
towards the same object become totally different
according as we see it strongly illuminated against a black
background or dark against light.

A fifth element is that of colour. That this has a direct
emotional effect is evident from such words as gay, dull,
melancholy in relation to colour.

I would suggest the possibility of another element, though
perhaps it is only a compound of mass and space: it is that
of the inclination to the eye of a plane, whether it is
impending over or leaning away from us.

Now it will be noticed that nearly all these emotional
elements of design are connected with essential
conditions of our physical existence: rhythm appeals to all
the sensations which accompany muscular activity; mass
to all the infinite adaptations to the force of gravity which
we are forced to make; the spatial judgment is equally
profound and universal in its application to life; our
feeling about inclined planes is connected with our
necessary judgments about the conformation of the earth
itself; light again, is so necessary a condition of our
existence that we become intensely sensitive to changes in
its intensity. Colour is the only one of our elements which
is not of critical or universal importance to life, and its
emotional effect is neither so deep nor so clearly
determined as the others. It will be seen, then, that the
graphic arts arouse emotions in us by playing upon what
one may call the overtones of some of our primary
physical needs. They have, indeed, this great advantage
over poetry, that they can appeal more directly and
immediately to the emotional accompaniments of our bare physical existence.

If we represent these various elements in simple diagrammatic terms, this effect upon the emotions is, it must be confessed, very weak. Rhythm of line, for instance, is incomparably weaker in its stimulus of the muscular sense than is rhythm addressed to the ear in music, and such diagrams can at best arouse only faint ghost-like echoes of emotions of differing qualities; but when these emotional elements are combined with the presentation of natural appearances, above all with the appearance of the human body, we find that this effect is indefinitely heightened.

When, for instance, we look at Michelangelo’s “Jeremiah,” and realize the irresistible momentum his movements would have, we experience powerful sentiments of reverence and awe.

Or when we look at Michelangelo’s “Tondo” in the Uffizi, and find a group of figures so arranged that the planes have a sequence comparable in breadth and dignity to the mouldings of the earth mounting by clearly-felt gradations to an overtopping summit, innumerable instinctive reactions are brought into play.¹

At this point the adversary (as Leonardo da Vinci calls him) is likely enough to retort, “You have abstracted from natural forms a number of so-called emotional elements which you yourself admit are very weak when stated with diagrammatic purity; you then put them back, with the help of Michelangelo, into the natural forms whence they were derived, and at once they have value, so that after all it appears that the natural forms contain these emotional elements ready made up for us, and all that art need do is to imitate Nature.”

But, alas! Nature is heartlessly indifferent to the needs of the imaginative life; God causes His rain to fall upon the just and upon the unjust. The sun neglects to provide the appropriate limelight effect even upon a triumphant Napoleon or a dying Caesar.² Assuredly we have no guarantee that in nature the emotional elements will be combined appropriately with the demands of the imaginative life, and it is, I think, the great occupation of the graphic arts to give us first of all order and variety in the sensuous plane, and then so to arrange the sensuous presentment of objects that the emotional elements are elicited with an order and appropriateness altogether beyond what Nature herself provides.

Let me sum up for a moment what I have said about the relation of art to Nature, which is, perhaps, the greatest stumbling-block to the understanding of the graphic arts.

I have admitted that there is beauty in Nature, that is to say, that certain objects constantly do, and perhaps any object may, compel us to regard it with that intense disinterested contemplation that belongs to the imaginative life, and which is impossible to the actual life

¹ Rodin is reported to have said, “A woman, a mountain, a horse—they are all the same thing; they are made on the same principles.” That is to say, their forms, when viewed with the disinterested vision of the imaginative life, have similar emotional elements.

² I do not forget that at the death of Tennyson the writer in the Daily Telegraph averred that “level beams of the setting moon streamed in upon the face of the dying bard”; but then, after all, in its way the Daily Telegraph is a work of art.
of necessity and action; but that in objects created to arouse the aesthetic feeling we have an added consciousness of purpose on the part of the creator, that he made it on purpose not to be used but to be regarded and enjoyed; and that this feeling is characteristic of the aesthetic judgment proper.

When the artist passes from pure sensations to emotions aroused by means of sensations, he uses natural forms which, in themselves, are calculated to move our emotions, and he presents these in such a manner that the forms themselves generate in us emotional states, based upon the fundamental necessities of our physical and physiological nature. The artist’s attitude to natural form is, therefore, infinitely various according to the emotions he wishes to arouse. He may require for his purpose the most complete representation of a figure, he may be intensely realistic, provided that his presentment, in spite of its closeness to natural appearance, disengages clearly for us the appropriate emotional elements. Or he may give us the merest suggestion of natural forms, and rely almost entirely upon the force and intensity of the emotional elements involved in his presentment.

We may, then, dispense once for all with the idea of likeness to Nature, of correctness or incorrectness as a test, and consider only whether the emotional elements inherent in natural form are adequately discovered, unless, indeed, the emotional idea depends at any point upon likeness, or completeness of representation.