

## Chapter 3

### Previous Relevant Research

#### 3.0 Overview

The goal of this chapter is to review the literature, identify and select criteria relevant for analyzing particles *–to*, *že*, and *ved’* as k-markers, and develop my own approach to tackling them.

In my attempt to analyze k-markers in colloquial Russian I will rely on previous research in a number of areas: theories of information packaging in a clause, theories of cognitive statuses of referential expressions, theories of hierarchical organization of discourse, and also on literature on particles in general. Since there is extensive literature on each of these subjects, in this chapter I will only be able to summarize the works that are most important for my analysis and briefly compare them to other sources.

Of most importance to this dissertation is Vallduví and Vilkuna’s (1998) article (referred to as V&V) where the notion of *kontrast* was first proposed. V&V’s ideas were introduced in chapter 1 and reviewed in detail in chapter 2. As for the other major theoretical “building blocks” that will be used in my analysis, I will briefly introduce them below.

The term *information packaging* refers to the way the information in a message is structured by the speaker according to his/her beliefs about the hearer’s mental

representation of discourse. The coining of this term is credited to Chafe (1976): using his metaphor — much as the packaging of toothpaste may affect its sales, irrespective of the quality of the product — two messages with the same truth conditions can be shaped by the speaker in a different way depending on what (the speaker assumes) the hearer already knows.

The theory of cognitive statuses of referential expressions is concerned with the relationship between the grammatical form of a referring expression and the cognitive status of its referent, such as its representation in the short- or long-term memory and its activation status.

Literatures on information packaging and the theory of reference overlap to certain degree since these two aspects are interrelated. However, it is important to keep them apart: such concepts belonging to the realm of information structure as “theme/rheme” or “presupposition/assertion” operate on the propositional, or clausal, level, while the theory of reference (with operating terminology such as “identifiability,” “activation,” or “familiarity,” and “salience”) is concerned with the status of referents, which can be established only by looking beyond the clausal level (i.e., at the discourse level) even though it (i.e., the referent status) is encoded at the level of a clause. This distinction is akin to Prince’s cautionary note on the importance of distinguishing between two types of information packaging—on the clausal/propositional level and on the level of NP (see Prince (1986, 1992a), discussed in Vallduví (1994: 574)).

This chapter is structured in the following way: First, I provide an overview of Vallduví’s (1992 and subsequent works) theory of information structure and compare it

to some other influential studies in the field (section 3.1). Second, I discuss Gundel et al.'s (1993) theory accounting for cognitive statuses of information in discourse and relate it to other important works (section 3.2). However, the theory of cognitive statuses that will figure most prominently in my analysis — Yokoyama's (1986) Transactional Discourse Model — is not discussed until section 3.4.1.<sup>1</sup> Buring's (2000, etc.) theory of discourse as a hierarchy is covered in section 3.3. The next section, 3.4, is devoted to a literature review on information packaging and discourse structure of Russian; here I first highlight Yokoyama's (1986) contributions and then briefly touch upon recent approaches to Russian word order. The chapter concludes with section 3.6, which summarizes the discussion and provides a glossary of terms and notations that will be used in subsequent chapters.

### ***3.1 Literature on Information Packaging***

Certain recent advances in pragmatics offer a more formalized way of analyzing the informational component (for references see the summary, section 3.1.2). In this dissertation I will be using a tripartite model of information packaging on the clausal level proposed in the works of Vallduví and his colleagues (1992, 1994, etc.)

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<sup>1</sup> The cognitive status of discourse referents is an integral part of Yokoyama's discourse model; however it is not the only dimension she is concerned with (the others being intonation, word order, etc.) I will discuss Yokoyama's approach in its entirety in section 3.4.1 and then, in section 3.5.1, while justifying my choice of terminology, I will return to the cognitive aspect of Yokoyama's theory and relate her ideas to those of Gundel et al. 1993.

### 3.1.1 Vallduví (1992, etc.)

In a series of studies, some in collaboration with other researchers, Vallduví proposes a comprehensive theory of information packaging (see, for example, Vallduví 1992, 1994, Vallduví and Engdahl 1996, Vallduví and Zacharsky 1994, and V&V).

The main contribution of Vallduví's theory is the incorporation of two binomial articulations of the information structure, i.e., the focus-ground framework and the topic-comment framework (alternatively called the given-new and the theme-rheme classifications, among others), into a single trinomial classification:<sup>2</sup>

The trinomial articulation divides sentences into a *focus* and a *ground*, while the latter is further composed of a *link* segment and a *tail* segment: [...]

S = { focus, ground }  
ground = { link, tail } (Vallduví 1994: 587)

The focus-ground division of a sentence captures the ontological distinction between *ground*, or “a non-informative, known, or expected part of the sentence which anchors [the sentence] to the previous discourse or the hearer's mental world” (ibid., 575) and *focus* or “an informative, news-bearing, dominant, or contrary-to-expectation part that is to be added to the discourse or the hearer's mental world” (ibid.)

The further subdivision of *ground* into *link* and *tail* serves a similar purpose as the topic-comment articulation: to identify what the sentence is about and what is said about it. Thus, Vallduví's concept of *link* is identical to the concept of a sentential *topic* in the

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<sup>2</sup> Vallduví (1992) provides a detailed discussion on the relationship of his tripartite model to other proposals in the literature, which is beyond the scope of this section; see the source for more detail.

topic-comment articulation. His concept of *tail* covers the remaining part of the ground material that is not topic-like.

Vallduví's model of information packaging offers insights into how information is added to the hearer's knowledge-store. Various combinations of *focus*, *link*, and *tail* (*all-focus*, *link-focus*, *link-focus-tail*, and *focus-tail*) provide specific instructions to the hearer on how the information contained in a given sentence is to be integrated into the hearer's knowledge-store:

The information carried by a given sentence  $S$  ( $I_s$ ) is defined as the propositional content of  $S$  ( $p_s$ ) minus the knowledge (the speaker assumes) the hearer already has and is attending to ( $K_H$ ), i.e.  $I_s = p_s - K_H$ . Each sentence encodes an information-packaging instruction, along with a propositional content (ibid., 588)

Vallduví adopts Heim's (1983) file metaphor in order to further describe the structure of the knowledge-store:

The knowledge-store is a collection of entity-denoting file cards. On each file card there are entries recording relations and attributes pertaining to the entity denoted by that file card. The marking of referential or cognitive status is responsible for providing the hearer with instructions for file card management. Very roughly, an indefinite NP instructs the hearer to create a new file card, while a definite NP instructs the hearer to activate a dormant, already existing file card. The content of these file cards is updated during communication, i.e., the information carried by the sentences in a discourse is entered in the hearer's knowledge-store. It is precisely here that information packaging plays a role by making this process more efficient (ibid., 588)

Employing the file card metaphor, the informational notions introduced by Vallduví can be viewed as instructions to the hearer, shown in (1):

(1) **Vallduví's informational notions as instructions to the hearer:**

*Focus*: “what the hearer is instructed to enter in her/his knowledge-store, i.e.,  $I_s$ ” (ibid.), or the new information to be entered into a file card.

*Ground*: “elements that indicate where and how to enter  $I_s$ ” (ibid., 589)

*Link*: “points to a specific file card for the entry of  $I_s$ ” (ibid.), or either opens an existing file card or creates a new, blank file card.

*Tail*: “further specifies how  $I_s$  fits on a given file card,” (ibid.), or provides instructions on where in the file card the new information is to be filed.

Vallduví (1994:589) provides the following examples of sentences containing various combinations of these instructional notions; specifically, the sentences in (2a/b) encode the *link-focus* instruction type, the ones in (3a/b) encode the *link-focus-tail* type, and the ones in (4a/b) represent the *all-focus* instruction-type (his 33a/b, 34a/b, 35a/b respectively):

(2a) What about Luke? What can you tell me about him?

[L Luke ] [F loves his DOG ]

(2b) What about Luke? What did he do?

[L Luke ] [F CALLED ]

(3a) What about Luke? How does he feel about his dog?

[L Luke ] [F LOVES ] his dog

(3b) What about Luke? Who does he love?

[L Luke ] loves [F his DOG ]

(4a) What's new?

[F LUKE called ]

(4b) Sign on a beachside store:

[F SHOES must be worn]

Thus, the *link-focus* instruction type, as in (2), receives the following interpretation: “Go to the file card ‘Luke’ in your knowledge-store and then enter the information of the sentence by adding on that file card that he loves his dog” (ibid., 590) for (2a) or that he called for (2b).

The *tailful* type, as in (3), provides a slightly different set of instructions: the presence of *link* directs the hearer to go to a specific file card, but the presence of *tail* instructs the hearer to search for specific information on the file card and either complete or alter that information. So, the sentence in (3a) is interpreted by the hearer in the following way: “Go to the file card ‘Luke’ in your knowledge-store and then enter the information of the sentence by substituting ‘loves’ for V in the record ‘Luke V his dog’ on that file card” (ibid.)

Finally, the *all-focus* instruction type, exemplified in (4), receives the following interpretation: “Enter the information of the sentence by adding to your knowledge-store that Luke called (on a default situation address)” (ibid.) for (4a) or that shoes must be worn inside the store for (4b).

Vallduví also emphasizes the importance of prosody in the structural encoding of information packaging: for example, the only structural difference between the pairs of sentences in (2b)-(4a) and (2a)-(3b) is prosodic.

### 3.1.2 Summary

There are other models of information structure proposed in the literature, some of the most recent ones include: Aissen (1992), Choi (1996), Erteschick-Shir (1997), Lambrecht (1994), and Zubizarreta (1998). The following collective volumes are also worth mentioning: Benedicto et al. (1998), Bosch and van der Sandt (1999), and Hajičová et al. (1998). The approaches discussed in these sources provide alternative ways of analyzing the structural encoding of information on the sentential, or clausal, level. A detailed discussion of these approaches would take us too far afield from the goals of the present study; however, I will discuss some proposals addressing the information structure of Russian (section 3.5) since the knowledge of these proposals might aid the reader in understanding placement rules of k-markers on the clausal level.

To summarize the section of theories of information packaging on the clausal level, the approach exemplified in the works of Vallduví and his colleagues appears to be adequate for the purposes of the present dissertation and will therefore be used for the analysis of particles as k-markers. I will, however, make certain changes in the notation to reflect the ideas of V&V; see section 3.5.1 at the end of this chapter for a detailed glossary of terms which will be used in this dissertation.

In the next section I will discuss literature on the theory accounting for cognitive statuses of referential expressions in discourse, the primary concern of which is to trace how the discourse status of referential expressions is encoded and which is also important for analyzing kontrastive particles.

### ***3.2 Theories of Cognitive Statuses of Referents in Discourse***

In this section I will discuss a theory accounting for cognitive statuses of referring expressions in discourse proposed in Gundel, Hedberg, and Zacharsky (1993) and compare it to other proposals in the literature (Prince 1981, 1992b, and others). Another theory, Yokoyama's (1986) model of knowledge transfer, which deals with similar issues but in a completely different framework, will be discussed in the section dealing with information packaging in Russian (section 3.5), since there are other important issues raised by her book. However, these two theories, i.e., Gundel et al. (1993) and Yokoyama (1986), will be referred to alternatively when describing the nature of information marked by kontrastive particles.

#### **3.2.1 Gundel, Hedberg, and Zacharsky (1993)**

This important work links forms of referring expressions in discourse to their cognitive statuses, continuing the discussion of the issues raised in earlier works by Garrod and Sanford (1982), Givón (1983, 1992), and Ariel (1988). The main premise of Gundel et al.'s theory is that "different determiners and pronominal forms conventionally signal different cognitive statuses (information about location in memory and attention state), thereby enabling the addressee to restrict the set of possible referents." (Gundel et al. 1993: 274-275). The authors propose to distinguish six cognitive statuses relevant to the form of referring expressions in natural language and organize them in "the Givenness

Hierarchy,” given here in Table (3.1). English forms of referring expressions serve as illustrations of the individual cognitive statuses:

**Table 3.1 Gundel et al. (1993: 275): The Givenness Hierarchy**

in focus >	activated >	familiar >	uniquely identifiable >	referential >	type identifiable
{ <i>it</i> }	<div style="display: inline-block; vertical-align: middle;"> <i>that</i>  {<i>this</i> }  <i>this</i> N </div>	{ <i>that</i> N}	{ <i>the</i> N}	{indefinite } <i>this</i> N	{ <i>a</i> N}

Gundel et al. agree with Garrod & Sanford (1982) and Ariel (1988) that the different nominal forms serve as processing signals to the addressee, but, unlike their predecessors, they do not treat cognitive statuses as mutually exclusive:

in the model we propose ... the statuses are implicationaly related (by definition), such that each status entails (and is therefore included by) all lower statuses, but not vice versa. The statuses are thus ordered from most restrictive (in focus) to least restrictive (type identifiable), with respect to the set of possible referents they include. For example, an entity which is in focus is necessarily also activated, familiar, uniquely identifiable, referential, and type identifiable. However, not all uniquely identifiable entities are familiar and not all familiar entities are either activated or in focus. (Gundel et al. 1993: 276)

Gundel et al.’s discussion of the individual cognitive statuses can be summarized in the following way (the quotations given below are from Gundel et al. 1993: 276-280; examples (5-9) are their (2-6); underline in examples is added—S.M.):

Type Identifiable: “The addressee is able to access a representation of the type of object described by the expression. This status is necessary for appropriate use of any nominal expression, and it is sufficient for use of the indefinite article *a* in English.” In

the example below, *a dog* is “appropriate only if the addressee is assumed to know the meaning of the word *dog*.”

- (5) *I couldn't sleep last night. A dog (next door) kept me awake.*

Referential: “The speaker intends to refer to a particular object or objects. To understand such an expression, the addressee not only needs to access an appropriate type-representation, he must either retrieve an existing representation of the speaker’s intended referent or construct a new representation by the time the sentence is processed. The status ‘referential’ is necessary for appropriate use of all definite expressions, and it is both necessary and sufficient for indefinite *this* in colloquial English.” In the example below, *this dog* is “appropriate only if the speaker intends to say something about a particular dog:”

- (6) *I couldn't sleep last night. This dog (next door) kept me awake.*

Uniquely Identifiable: “The addressee can identify the speaker’s intended referent on the basis of the nominal alone. This status is a necessary condition for all definite reference, and it is both necessary and sufficient for appropriate use of the definite article *the*.” The addressee is expected either to retrieve an existing representation from memory or to construct one based on the descriptive content encoded in the nominal itself, without the rest of the sentence (as would be the case with referential but not uniquely identifiable expressions). Thus, in the example below, the phrase *the dog next door* “would be perfectly felicitous even if the addressee had no previous knowledge that the speaker’s neighbor has a dog:”

(7) *I couldn't sleep last night. The dog (next door) kept me awake.*

Familiar: “The addressee is able to uniquely identify the intended referent because he already has a representation of it in memory (in long-term memory if it has not been recently mentioned or perceived, or in short-term memory if it has). This status is necessary for all personal pronouns and definite demonstratives, and it is sufficient for appropriate use of the demonstrative determiner *that*.” Thus, the example below is “appropriate only if the addressee already knows that the speaker’s neighbor has a dog:”

(8) *I couldn't sleep last night. That dog (next door) kept me awake.*

Activated: “The referent is represented in current short-term memory. Activated representations may have been retrieved from long-term memory, or they may arise from the immediate linguistic or extralinguistic context... Activation is necessary for appropriate use of all pronominal forms, and it is sufficient for the demonstrative pronoun *that* as well as for stressed personal pronouns. The pronoun *that* in [the sentence below] can thus be used appropriately to refer to the barking of a dog only if a dog has actually been barking during the speech even or if barking had been introduced in the immediate linguistic context:”

(9) *I couldn't sleep last night. That kept me awake.*

In Focus: “The referent is not only in short-term memory, but is also at the current center of attention. This status is necessary for appropriate use of zero and unstressed pronominals. The entities in focus at a given point in the discourse will be that

partially-ordered subset of activated entities which are likely to be continued as topics of subsequent utterances. Thus, entities in focus generally include at least the topic of the preceding utterance, as well as any still-relevant higher-order topics.”

Gundel et al. compare the proposed Givenness Hierarchy to Prince’s (1981)

Familiarity Scale:

(10) **Prince’s (1981) Familiarity Scale:**

(Situationally) Evoked > Unused > Inferrable > Containing Inferrable >  
Brand New Anchored > Brand New

They point out the following distinctions between these two classifications: first, the statuses in Prince’s (1981) Familiarity Scale are mutually exclusive, while the higher-ranking statuses in their Givenness Hierarchy entail the lower-ranking ones. Second, there is no one-to-one correspondence between Gundel et al.’s cognitive statuses and Prince’s statuses of givenness/newness: 1) Prince’s status of “(situationally) evoked” corresponds to two distinct cognitive status in the Givenness Hierarchy—“in focus” and “activated;” 2) Prince’s category of “inferrables” does not correspond to any of Gundel et al.’s cognitive statuses: these authors view inferrables

not as a separate cognitive status but rather as a way that something can achieve a particular status by association with an entity that has been activated. We would thus expect inferrables to have different statuses, and to be coded by different forms, depending on the nature and strength of the link between the inferrable and its associated discourse entity. (Gundel et al. 1993: 281)

Gundel et al. point out that since most inferrables have a status lower than familiar (uniquely identifiable or referential), they cannot be referenced by pronouns or

demonstrative determiners. The authors, however, provide a few examples of cases where the link between the inferrable and the discourse entity associated with it is strong enough for the inferrable to be interpreted as having a higher-ranking status (familiar or even activated) and, therefore, to be referenced by pronominal forms. The article, however, does not elaborate on the nature of this link between the inferrable and the related discourse entity.

Also, this article does not address Prince's (1992b) classification of discourse entities with respect to their discourse- and hearer-status, which provides a finer account than her earlier (1981) classification of discourse entities into brand-new, unused, and evoked<sup>3</sup>:

**(11) Prince's (1992b: 309) classification of Hearer- and Discourse-status of a discourse entity:**

	Discourse-new	Discourse-old
Hearer-new:	Brand-new	N/A
Hearer-old:	Unused	Evoked

My attempt to track correspondence between three classifications—Gundel et al. (1993), Prince (1981), Prince (1992b)—is represented in Table 3.2:

<sup>3</sup> Prince (1992b) still treats inferrables as a separate category: according to her, inferrables are “technically Hearer-new and Discourse-new but... are being treated as though they were Hearer-old and possibly also Discourse-old” (p. 309).

**Table 3.2 Gundel et al. (1993), Prince (1981), and Prince (1992b) in Comparison**

<b>Givenness Hierarchy</b> <i>Gundel et al. 1993</i>	<b>in focus &gt;</b>	<b>activated &gt;</b>	<b>familiar &gt;</b>	<b>uniquely &gt;</b> <b>identifiable</b>	<b>referential &gt;</b>	<b>type</b> <b>identifiable</b>
English forms <i>Gundel et al. 1993</i>	<i>it</i>	<i>that</i> <i>this</i> <i>this N</i>	<i>that N</i>	<i>the N</i>	indefinite <i>this</i> N	<i>a N</i>
Russian forms <i>Gundel et al. 1993</i>	Ø <i>on</i> 'he'	ON <i>èto</i> 'this' <i>to</i> 'that'	<i>èto N</i> <i>to N</i>	Ø N		
<b>Familiarity Scale</b> <i>Prince 1981</i>	<b>evoked/ &gt;</b> <b>situationally evoked</b>		<b>unused &gt;</b>	<b>containing &gt;</b> <b>inferrable</b>	<b>brand new &gt;</b> <b>(anchored)</b>	<b>brand new</b>
<b>Hearer- &amp; Discourse- status</b> <i>Prince 1992b</i>	<b>Discourse-old / Hearer-old</b>		<b>D-new/ H-old</b>		<b>D-new / H-new</b>	

**Notes to Table 3.2**

a) Gundel et al.'s (1993) and Prince's (1981) classifications are organized as hierarchical or scalar models (a cognitive status entails the one to the right, which is indicated by ">": *in focus*, thus *activated*, etc.), while in Prince's (1992b) classifications the statuses of discourse entities are mutually exclusive.

b) Prince's (1981) category of **inferrables** is not included in Table 3.2 since it can correspond to a variety of Gundel et al.'s (1993) cognitive statuses depending on the strength of the link between the inferrable and its associated discourse entity.

Gundel et al. tests the universality of the Givenness Hierarchy on four additional languages: Mandarin Chinese, Japanese, Russian, and Spanish. Of particular interest are the Russian forms of referring expressions, which are also given in Table 3.2. As pointed out by these authors, since Russian lacks determiners, a bare noun can be interpreted as either type identifiable (indefinite, “any”) or referential (specific, “an existent, a certain”) or uniquely identifiable (definite). They, however, do not elaborate on what linguistic means Russian (or other languages) employ to distinguish between these three cognitive statuses. The authors use Grice’s (1975) Maxim of Quantity to account for the actual distribution and interpretation of referring expressions in naturally occurring discourse in the five languages studied.

Gundel et al. (1993) deals with cognitive statuses of entities as encoded only in the form of referring expressions. However, languages exploit other means of signaling the cognitive statuses, such as syntactical means (word order, various constructions), morphological (nominal case systems, noun incorporation), and also intonation and particles.

### **3.2.2 Summary**

In this section I have discussed Gundel, Hedberg, and Zacharsky’s (1993) theory of cognitive statuses of referring expressions and related it to other advances in the fields, such as Prince (1981, 1992b), etc.

To summarize, the theory proposed in Gundel et al. (1993) is relevant to the present study since their framework provides means of distinguishing between different cognitive

statuses of referents, which is going to be an important factor in describing the functions of various particles in colloquial Russian. However, there are two major drawbacks in Gundel et al.'s classification:<sup>4</sup> a) it does not incorporate the speaker's subjective view about the location of information in the hearer's knowledge set and b) it does not reflect the degree of saliency.

A different theory, which incorporates the hearer dimension with the saliency dimension in one model — Yokoyama's (1986) Transactional Discourse Model, — will be reviewed below, in section 3.4.1. The correspondences between the cognitive statuses of discourse entities as proposed in Gundel et al. (1993) and Yokoyama (1986) will be discussed in section 3.5.1. In anticipation of this, I will only remark here that I will primarily use Gundel et al.'s concise labels of cognitive statuses (especially “activated” and “in focus”) to refer to a very precise but less conventional notation of Yokoyama's system.<sup>5</sup>

### ***3.3 Theories of Discourse Structure***

There are a number of recent approaches that deal with a hierarchical organization of discourse: see, for example, Grenoble (1998), Grosz and Sidner (1986, 1990), among

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<sup>4</sup> Thanks to Gregory Ward for sharing his thoughts on these issues (see Ward 2000; for his purposes, Ward uses Prince's 1992b classification with the added parameter of saliency; also see Kehler and Ward 2000).

<sup>5</sup> Using Gundel et al.'s terminology parallel to the notation offered by Yokoyama will also serve the goal of popularizing Yokoyama's ideas: even though her theory is very well known in the field of Slavic linguistics, there are scarcely any references to it by non-Slavists.

others. In this dissertation, I have chosen to rely on the model of discourse proposed in the works by Büring (2000, etc.).<sup>6</sup>

### 3.3.1 Büring (2000, etc.)

Büring proposes a theory of discourse as a hierarchy, which links recent advances in the syntactic and phonological theories to the structure of discourse; see for example Büring (1998a,b, 1999, 2000, and his other works).

According to Büring, there are restrictions on how the discourse can proceed at any given point. This limited set of possibilities to continue the discourse is labeled by Büring as D(iscourse)-Topic. Now a question arises: how to establish a D-Topic, or, in other words, how to set a course for the next utterance. Büring proposes that the simplest way to do this is to ask a question. This is not a radically new proposal so far: question/answer sequences have been utilized in the linguistic literature for various purposes. However, Büring proposes to view each utterance in the discourse as an answer to some explicit or implicit question, which he labels *Question Under Discussion*, or *QUD*. If the answer to this explicit or implicit QUD is not *congruent* with the question (which means that it provides either more or less information than is required by the question or something related to what was asked about), the “deviant” part of it is intonationally marked (cf. the traditional notion of contrastive topics/foci or V&V’s notion of *kontrast*). Büring (1995: 6-7 of the final draft) provides the following example, shown in (12):

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<sup>6</sup> For similar proposals see Kanerva and Gabriele (1995), van Kuppevelt (1995, 1996a,b), and Roberts (1996).

- (12) A: Which book would Fritz buy?  
 B: Well, [I]<sub>T</sub> would buy [‘The Hotel New HAMPshire’]<sub>F</sub>

The question in (12), according to Büring, contains a proposition of the form ‘*Fritz would buy \_\_\_\_\_*’ (or, in other words, the proposition contains a variable). Its denotation, or *Focus value* in Büring’s terminology, is a set of possible answers, as illustrated in (13):

- (13) {Fritz would buy ‘The Hotel New Hampshire’, F. would buy ‘War and Peace’, ...}

Looking back at B’s answer in (12), it can be noticed that there is a mismatch between A’s question and B’s answer, and since the latter is not congruent with the former, the deviant part has to be intonationally marked. What the prosodic prominence on *I* does is introducing what Büring labels the *Topic value*, which is semantically represented by a set of sets:

- (14) { {I would buy ‘The Hotel New Hampshire’, I would buy ‘War and Peace’, ...},  
 {Fritz would buy ‘The Hotel NH’, Fritz would buy ‘War & Peace’, ...},  
 {Paul Simon would buy ‘The Hotel NH’, P. S. would buy ‘War & Peace’, ...}, ... }

Büring’s notions of *Topic* and *Focus* seem to correspond to what has been discussed in the literature under the labels of “contrastive topics” and “contrastive foci”

respectively. Or, looked to from a different perspective, Buring's ideas appear to be very close to V&V's notion of *kontrast*, even though he does not use this term. In my analysis of kontrastive particles, I will rely on Buring's insights with respect to how a set (or a set of sets) gets evoked in the hearer's mind (especially see the discussion of the particle *-to* in chapters 4 and 5) but I will use V&V's terminology.


Another important point in Buring's work, which will also be applied to my analysis of kontrastive markers, is the idea that discourse structure can be analyzed as a hierarchy of semantically related questions, or *Super-* and *Sub-Questions* (based on his postulate that everything in discourse is the answer to some explicit or implicit question). A sample discourse from Buring (1998b: 16-17) is given in (15), where the indentation reflects the dominance relationship among the utterances:

**(15) Buring's view of discourse as hierarchy of Sub- and Super-Questions:**

How was the concert?	
Was the sound good?	No, it was awful.
How was the audience?	It was enthusiastic.
How was the band?	
How was the drummer?	Just fantastic.
And what about the singer?	Better than ever.
Did they play old songs?	Not a single one.
So what did you do after the concert?...	

Buring also offers an alternative way of representing this hierarchical organization of discourse as in the form of a discourse tree, shown in (16). I will use the format of his discourse trees for illustrating discourse properties of kontrastive particles.

(14) **Büring's D(iscourse) Tree** (Büring 1998b: 17):



Some of Büring's ideas which will be relevant for the analysis of kontrastive particles are summarized below:

- Every statement in discourse is the answer to some (explicit or implicit) *Question Under Discussion (QUD)*.
- Discourse is a hierarchy of questions and sub-questions, which are organized in a *D(iscourse)-Tree*.
- Any node in a D-Tree is called a *Move*.
- For any Move M, the question minimally dominating it is called the *Immediate Question Under Discussion (IQUD)*.
- For any Move M, if M is a question, the sub-tree rooted in M is called the *strategy* to answer M.
- Any Move M must be *congruent* and *relevant* to the *IQUD(M)*.

### 3.3.2 Summary

In the present study of kontrastive particles in colloquial Russian, I will utilize certain insights offered by Büring's model of discourse organization. Specifically, his formal representation of set-evoking properties of some linguistic constructions and expressions will be applied to the analysis of k-markers (especially, particle *-to*). Also, the format of his discourse trees will be used to illustrate the discourse characteristics of kontrastive particles. Since Büring's notions of *Topic* and *Focus* are constrained in ways that bring them closer to the notion of *kontrast*, I will use Vallduví's (1992, etc.) and V&V's terminology to refer to the similar phenomena: Büring's *C(ontrastive) T(opic)* will be discussed under the label of *kontrastive link* and his *C(ontrastive) F(ocus)* will be labeled *kontrastive rheme*.

In the next section I will turn to discussing literature on various aspects of information packaging in Russian that might aid the reader in understanding the properties and functions of kontrastive particles.

### 3.4 *Information Packaging and Discourse Structure of Russian*

Russian is a discourse configurational language: neither its sentence structure nor the overall organization of Russian discourse can be analyzed without utilizing some version of the information packaging theory and the theory accounting for cognitive statuses of referents in discourse. In this section I will review some notable approaches both to information packaging on the clausal level (traditionally viewed as the "word order"

problem, even though there are other aspects, such as prosodic structure, function of certain particles, etc., that contribute to the information packaging on the level of a clause in Russian) and to the structure of Russian discourse.

First, I will discuss Yokoyama (1986), an approach that tackles both areas most successfully. Yokoyama's model of verbal transfer of knowledge will be referred to when describing the cognitive status of information marked by kontrastive particles.

Then Yokoyama's theory will be briefly compared to more recent syntactic analyses of Russian word order as found in King (1993), Bailyn (1995), Junghanns & Zybatow (1997), Alter & Junghanns (1997), among others.

### **3.4.1 Yokoyama (1986)**

Yokoyama develops a model of knowledge transfer between the interlocutors, which she claims to be universal, and tests it on Russian data. The main strength of this study is the treatment of word order<sup>7</sup> and intonation as two interrelated aspects of information structure in Russian.

Yokoyama's model of the transfer of knowledge, which she graphically represents in terms of Venn diagrams, can be briefly<sup>8</sup> described as the following: interlocutors A and B each possess a set of knowledge, which Yokoyama labels A and B respectively. These knowledge sets A and B partially overlap (by virtue of sharing the CODE—or,

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<sup>7</sup> The book also provides a detailed excursus into the history of studies on Russian word order.

<sup>8</sup> I am glossing over many important issues brought up by Yokoyama's book, such as various types of communicable knowledge, the typology of discourse-initial and non-discourse initial utterances, etc.

roughly, the language and the culture, and DEIXIS—the time and the space of the interaction, among other things). Also, each of the interlocutors possesses a “set of matters of current concern,” or  $C_a$  and  $C_b$ , which are subsets of A and B respectively. For a verbal transfer of knowledge to take place,  $C_a$  and  $C_b$ , should intersect, or in other terms, the intersection of  $C_a$  and  $C_b$  (i.e.,  $C_a \cap C_b$ ) should not be null. So, according to Yokoyama, interpersonal informational discourse can be viewed as a series of steps promoting items into  $C_a \cap C_b$ . She also distinguishes the center of a set of current concern from its periphery, although this important distinction is not formalized in her model.

Below I will summarize the advantages and disadvantages of Yokoyama’s model of knowledge transfer:

advantages:

- a broad and detailed model with a claim to being linguistically universal;
- utilization of an approach that analyzes information transfer from the speaker’s point of view;
- incorporation of both intonation and word order into her model;
- recognition of the importance of some particles in organizing information structure;

disadvantages:

- testing of her model has been done on only one language (Russian) and on only relatively short discourse samples (no more than several sentences);
  - as a result, her analysis of information structure does not go beyond the level of the clause;
  - no formalized distinction is made between the center and the periphery of the set of matters of current concern (cf., distinct notions of *in focus* and *activated* in Gundel et al. 1993).
-

Many of these disadvantages are perceivable only now, after important advances have been made in the theory of information packaging and adjacent areas of linguistics:<sup>9</sup> in 1986, when Yokoyama's monograph appeared, her model of knowledge transfer was at the forefront of theory. In my analysis of set-evoking particles, I will use Yokoyama's model of verbal knowledge transfer as the main framework for describing the cognitive status of information marked by the particles; however, I will use concise labels from Gundel et al.'s (1993) framework (see section 3.2.1 above) to refer to some cognitive statuses.

A particularly important feature of Yokoyama's work is her treatment of Russian intonation in conjunction with word order. She provides a detailed critique of the widely accepted inventory of seven intonational constructions, or the so-called "IKs" (see for example, Bryzgunova 1963, 1977, 1982<sup>10</sup>)<sup>11</sup> and develops her own framework of Russian intonation that "incorporates both semantically significant pitch contours and sentential stress" (Yokoyama 1986: 181). She proposes to distinguish two utterance intonation types—Type I and Type II, which would roughly correspond to the distinction between non-emotive and emotive utterances, as suggested in Krylova and Khavronina (1988). Only utterances with intonation Type II have a sentential stress (and inverted word

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<sup>9</sup> Worth mentioning here are advances made to Yokoyama's model by her students: Moon (1995) and Schnittke (2000).

<sup>10</sup> For studies on Russian word order done by linguists in Russia see Krylova and Khavronina (1988), Sirotnina (1965), Kovtunova (1976), Bryzgunova (1963, 1977); also see relevant articles in the two-volume set of the Russian grammar prepared by the Academy of Sciences, edited by Švedova et al. (1980 and subsequent reprints).

order). Adopting Pierrehumbert's (1980) theory to her analysis of Russian intonation, Yokoyama gives the following definition to intonation Type I:

...the invariable core of Type I intonation can be described as a potentially iterative phonemic rising contour tone LH (L = "low", H = "high"), concluded by a falling contour tone HL. This can be expressed as  $\backslash LH \backslash_n HL$ , where  $n$  is the number of non-final syntagms, and  $\backslash \backslash$  indicates the range over which downstep is implemented. (Yokoyama 1986: 183)

By applying Pierrehumbert's (1980) notion of "downstep," which stands for "the stepwise lowering of pitch (or of the tonal space) at specific pitch accents" (Ladd 1996: 74), Yokoyama claims to account for such diverse variations in intonation patterns as those dependent on the length of the utterance and the pitch range of the speaker:

The absolute height of each downstep is not constant, but is a function of the length of the utterance, the number of downsteps, and the normal pitch range of a given speaker: the normal range is fixed, and as the number of syntagms on which downstep is implemented increases, the height of the first peak is raised (within the ceiling for each speaker) and the relative height of each step down is decreased so that the end of the utterance fit in above the base line, i.e. the normal lower limit of a speaker's voice range. (Yokoyama 1986: 187)

More on the advantages of Yokoyama's approach over Bryzgunova's inventory of IKs, in Yokoyama's own words:

Positing a  $\backslash LH \backslash_n HL$  as the invariant core of Type 1 intonation eliminates the ad hoc assignment, to a potentially open set of syntagms, of a series of rising IKs that gradually decrease in height. Such an analysis runs counter to the obvious fact that the number and the height of the intermediate pitch levels is nothing more than a function of the length of the sentence and its division into syntagms. (Yokoyama 1986: 186)

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<sup>11</sup>For an alternative analysis of Russian intonation see Odé (1989): in this study a method of perceptual analysis/resynthesis, or the stylization method, is applied to Russian. This study does not, however, offer any insights into the functional meanings of the discovered intonation patterns.

As for the utterance intonation Type II, this label is assigned by Yokoyama to “a number of utterance intonation contours that all share a single fundamental feature, namely, the presence of sentential stress” (Yokoyama 1986: 191). “Sentential stress” is defined as “that stress which marks the knowledge item that would occur in utterance-final position, were the same sentence to be uttered with intonation Type I instead” (ibid.) She points out that defining sentential stress in terms of a non-phonological parameter, and specifically, in terms of the word order parameter, is the only viable way; this also indicates the impossibility of separating the description of Russian intonation from word order. She further argues that no single acoustic, articulatory or perceptual feature can define sentential stress but rather it is the product of complex interaction of multiple factors:

The essential relativity of all the features that correlate with sentential stress within an utterance suggests, however, that it may be appropriate to define sentential stress *without reference to its own* prosody, intensity, or duration etc., but rather *relatively*, in terms of contrast with the intonational character of the rest of an utterance with Type II intonation. (Yokoyama 1986: 187)

In my analysis of kontrastive markers in colloquial Russian I will use Yokoyama’s distinction between Type I and Type II intonation contours. To summarize the main features of these contrasting intonation types: intonation Type I covers utterances in the so-called non-emotive speech, with non-inverted word order, and can be characterized as a  $\backslash\text{LH}\backslash_n\text{HL}$  contour, where  $n$  stands for the number of non-final syntagms, and  $\backslash\backslash$  indicates the scope of downstep. Intonation Type II can be characterized by the presence

of sentential stress and inverted word order, both of which are necessary features of so-called emotive speech.

In addition to adopting Yokoyama's model of verbal transfer and her approach to Russian intonation, I will refer to other important points raised by her book throughout the dissertation.

### **3.4.2 Recent Syntactic Approaches to Russian Word Order**

In my analysis of kontrastive particles in colloquial Russian, I will not make an attempt to refer to an exact syntactic position of the information marked by these particles; therefore, I will only briefly review the major works on Russian that deal with syntactic encoding of such informational notions as *topic/theme* or *focus/rheme*. Among those are: King (1993), Bailyn (1995), and works of Alter, Junghanns, and Zybatow (Junghanns & Zybatow 1997, Alter & Junghanns 1997, etc.).

It is interesting to note that two of these approaches, i.e. King (1993) and Bailyn (1995), which differ a great deal from each other, refer to Yokoyama's model of knowledge transfer in one way or another. Other common feature between these two approaches include the following: both King (1993) and Bailyn (1995) utilize a version of the generative syntactic theory; both draw their data from Contemporary Literary Russian and not from colloquial Russian, and in both dissertations illustrations are given without sufficient context: the basic format is a question-answer pair. Both authors focus primarily on word order, while intonation is not given proper treatment, even though each discusses intonation at some length (basically adopting Yokoyama's treatment of

intonation). And neither King nor Bailyn touch upon mental status of referents or incorporate speaker's assessment of the hearer's state of knowledge or attention. Now let us examine each approach in detail.

### 3.4.2.1 King (1993)

King examines the syntactic encoding of topic and focus in Russian within two frameworks, i.e. the generative Government and Binding theory and the functional Lexical Functional Grammar. She adopts a tri-partite division of a clause into topic—discourse neutral material—focus.<sup>12</sup> By defining “topic” broadly, in Yokoyama's terms: “the material in the set  $C_a \cap C_b$ ” (King 1993:64), which is the set of matters of shared current concern, she allows for simultaneous multiple topics. She also distinguishes between clause-external and clause-internal topics, without any further subcategorization of these two types of topics. She does, however, discuss the ordering of multiple clause-internal topics and refers to Yokoyama's observation that the topics that are added to  $C_a \cap C_b$  more recently tend to appear before those that have been placed in the set earlier.

King also understands “focus” very broadly: “all new information in an utterance is focused” (King 1993: 88). She observes that in Russian focus is encoded by intonation and word order and distinguishes the following types of foci for Russian: contrastive focus, new-information focus, and presentational focus (the latter, according to her, can be considered a type of new information focus). As for the discourse-neutral information,

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<sup>12</sup> King's tripartite division is not unlike Vallduví's (1992, etc.); more details to follow below.

King defines it by exclusion: whatever is neither a topic nor a focus, is viewed as discourse-neutral.<sup>13</sup>

King argues that Russian is underlyingly VSO, even though it is commonly assumed to be SVO since the surface word order in the great majority of clauses is such. Adopting the VP-internal subject hypothesis (Koopman and Sportiche (1985), Fukui and Speas (1986)), King proposes that subjects in Russian originate at SpecVP. The Verb movement to I (or rather “ $\Sigma$ ” in King’s notation, which stands for a functional category containing inflection and negation) is obligatory. It is this word order—VSO—after the verb’s obligatory movement, which King recognizes as basic, or underlying, or discourse-neutral. All other word orders are the result of not structural but discourse-driven movements: some arguments move out of the base-generated positions to receive the topic interpretation, while others move out to be interpreted as focal. According to King, topics adjoin to IP (or  $\Sigma$ P in her terminology; adjunction of multiple constituents is allowed in GB), while Spec $\Sigma$ P licenses contrastive foci.

King avoids many complexities of Russian word order by excluding data from colloquial Russian and opting not to treat in detail word order variations in emotive sentences, whose word order varies far more than in Contemporary Standard Literary Russian. However, King seems to be aware of the limitations of her account: she leaves for future research such important issues as testing her theory on other languages

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<sup>13</sup>With all the confusion in terminology that the field of information structure is famous for, King’s tripartite division of the clause into *topic - discourse-neutral material - focus* is reminiscent of Vallduví’s classification of clause material into *ground* (subdivided into *link* and *tail*) and *rheme*. However, King does not offer any detailed treatment of discourse-neutral information, while in Vallduví’s theory the existence of *tail* is motivated both practically and theoretically. See section 3.1.1 for more detail.

(especially other Slavic languages) or language varieties (the most important being colloquial Russian) and applying it to an analysis of a connected discourse.

### 3.4.2.2 Bailyn (1995)

Bailyn (1995, also 1991, 1994) takes a rather different stand: he adopts Bowers' (1993) theory which assumes the presence of the so-called Pr(edication) Phrase and argues that Russian is an SVO language, and not VSO as proposed by King (1993). Bailyn postulates a distinct level of functional representation, or Function Form, responsible for assigning discourse roles to constituents in the clause.<sup>14</sup>

By expanding on Diesing's (1992) theory of tree splitting, Bailyn proposes a formal mechanism that captures the process of certain constituents being assigned a particular information status and labels it "Generalized Tree Splitting" (or GTS). In his model, the upper  $\alpha$  clause is associated with the *Tema* (or *theme*, which is in his account equivalent to the syntactic notion of *topic*) and the lower  $\beta$  clause is associated with the *Rema* (or *rheme*, equivalent to the syntactic notion of *focus*). Bailyn utilizes a binary division of information into *Tema* (=theme, topic) and *Rema* (=rheme, focus), without further subdivision of either category.<sup>15</sup>

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<sup>14</sup> Even though King stresses the importance of having a level of functional representation, she does not propose it directly; cf. also Kondrashova's (1996) proposal to distinguish I(nformation)-structure, a level of representation distinct from LF.

<sup>15</sup> It is unclear what position would be assigned to such informational components as *discourse neutral information* (King 1993) or *tail* (Vallduví 1992). The closest Bailyn comes to acknowledging this problem is calling for a need of further ordering within the *Tema* and *Rema* (footnote 32, page 324).

Bailyn claims that his Generalized Tree Structure model accounts for variations in word order and intonation patterns in Russian, but many issues remain unsolved. Moreover, some of his examples are of questionable grammaticality.

### 3.4.2.3 Alter, Junghanns, and Zybatow

Some of the pitfalls present in King (1993) and Bailyn (1995) are avoided in the framework proposed by these German linguists; see for example, Junghanns (1997a, b), Junghanns & Zybatow (1997), Zybatow & Junghanns (1998), Alter (1997), Alter & Junghanns (1997) and other works by these authors. The advantages of their syntactic approach to word order in Russian include:

- a) providing sufficient context for the sentences under analysis;
- b) treating word order in conjunction with intonation;
- c) paying (at least some) attention to colloquial varieties of Russian;
- d) drawing their data from naturalistic corpora, in addition to constructed examples;
- e) going beyond a binary division of the clause.

The last property needs to be elaborated on. Junghanns, Zybatow, and Alter assume two separate functional divisions: the *focus-background structure (FBS)* and the *topic-comment structure (TCS)*, which they do not equate with a tripartite division into *topic-neutral material-focus*. The *FBS* defines what is emphasized as important information in any given context, while the *TCS* defines what the sentence is about. The majority of studies by these researchers have been so far concentrated on refining our understanding of *topics*, and not *foci* (see, however, Alter 1997).

In a series of their papers, Junghanns, Zybatow, and Alter assume that the functional structure of Russian clauses contains a split Infl structure, where topics adjoin to the Agr<sub>s</sub> Phrase (the split Infl structure allows for multiple adjunction of topics).

### 3.4.3 Summary

Even though a lot of progress has been made in accounting for information structure of the Russian clause (especially, with respect to word order and intonation variations) and for the overall organization of discourse in Russian, there is still a lot to be done in both areas. In my opinion, a comprehensive theory of information packaging for any natural language would ideally be able to incorporate and account for (at least) these components:

- a) syntactic devices, such as word order and certain constructions;
- b) prosodic means, such as intonation patterns and sentential stress;
- c) lexical expressions indicating the informational status of elements, such as particles, semantic operators, and discourse markers;
- d) morphological devices, such as certain affixes serving a similar purpose in some languages;
- e) semantic components, such as kontrast.

In addition, such theory of information structure on the level of a clause should be complemented with a comprehensive theory of discourse structure in conjunction with a cognitive theory accounting for distribution and activation of referring expressions in discourse.

In this dissertation I will not be able to address all aspects of information structure and discourse organization outlined above. Instead, I will concentrate on certain aspects that have not received adequate attention so far: my goal is to demonstrate how the set-generating, or kontrastive, nature of colloquial Russian particles *–to*, *že*, and *ved'*, contributes to organization on both the clausal and the discourse levels.

### ***3.5 Literature Review: Summary***

In this chapter I have reviewed the literature on particles in general and on a group of colloquial Russian particles (including particles *–to*, *že*, and *ved'*) which have been traditionally analyzed as “emphatic,” “intensifying,” or “contrastive.” Then, I have touched upon theories that would be utilized in the analysis of these particles as kontrastive in the present dissertation: information packaging on the clausal level (Vallduví), a cognitive theory of reference (Yokoyama, Gundel et al.), and a theory of a hierarchical organization of discourse (Büring). Literature on various aspects of information structure and discourse structure of Russian has also been reviewed.

In the next section I will summarize the terminology that will be used for the analysis of particles *–to*, *že*, and *ved'* as kontrastive markers in the remaining chapters.

#### **3.5.1 Terminology**

The following terminology will be used in the remaining part of this dissertation:

- **kontrast**: the ability of certain linguistic expressions to generate a set of alternatives (V&V);  
the scope of the element marked as kontrastive will be indicated by [+K ...] notation;
  - **kontrastive** will be used synonymously with **set-generating** and **set-evoking**;
  - **kontrastive marker**, or **k-marker**: a linguistic expression – syntactic, morphological, prosodic, or lexical – that signals kontrast; or, in other words, causes the hearer/reader to evoke a membership set which the kontrastively marked element belongs to, and treat this element as a member of this set.  
I will be primarily concerned with lexemes signaling kontrast, i.e. particles *–to, že, and ved’*;
- terminology pertaining to information packaging at the clausal level  
(based on Vallduví 1992, etc. and V&V):
  - **rheme**: “an informative, news-bearing, dominant, or contrary-to-expectation part that is to be added to the discourse or the hearer’s mental world”<sup>16</sup>;  
the scope of rheme will be marked by [+Rh ...];  
the element that is both kontrastive and rhematic will be marked by [+K/+Rh ...]; note that the scope of kontrast is not always co-extensive with the scope of rheme: I will be primarily concerned with the (sub)part of rheme that is kontrastive;
  - **link**: points to a specific file card for the entry of rheme; either opens an existing file card or creates a new, blank file card;  
*link* is identical to the concept of a sentential *topic* in the topic-comment articulation;  
the scope of the *link* will be marked by [-Rh ...];<sup>17</sup>

<sup>16</sup> This definition is originally given in Vallduví (1994: 575) for the term *focus*. In the spirit of V&V’s ideas I will use this definition to apply to the term *rheme* and not *focus*.

<sup>17</sup> I adopt the tripartite division of the clause proposed in Vallduví (1992, etc.; cf. similar proposals King 1993 among others); however, since I will be primarily concerned with the distribution of kontrastive elements, which can be found within the *link* or the *rheme* but not within the *tail* (corresponding to the

the kontrastive element within the link will be marked by [+K/-Rh ...]; note that the scope of kontrast is not always co-extensive with the scope of link: I will be primarily concerned with the (sub)part of link that is kontrastive;

- terminology pertaining to the theory of cognitive statuses of discourse referents (based on Yokoyama 1986, with some labels borrowed from Gundel et al. 1993):
  - **A, B:** speaker's (A) and hearer's (B) knowledge sets;
  - **$A \cap B$ :** the intersection of the interlocutors' knowledge sets; alternatively referred to as information known to both the speaker and the hearer but not necessarily activated in their minds at the time of the utterance;
  - **$C_a, C_b$ :** speaker's (A) and hearer's (B) sets of matters of current concern;
  - **$C_a \cap C_b$ :** the intersection of the speaker's (A) and hearer's (B) sets of matters of current concern, or a set of shared matters of current concern, i.e., the information that is activated in both the speaker's and the hearer's minds; the center of this set is distinguished from its periphery (roughly corresponding to *in focus* versus *activated* statuses in Gundel et al.'s 1993 terminology);
  - **$C_a \cap (B - C_b)$ :** the intersection of the speaker's (A) set of matters of current concern with the subset of the hearer's (B) knowledge set which excludes the hearer's set of matters of current concern; i.e., information which the speaker is currently concerned with and which is assumed by the speaker to be known to the hearer but not currently activated in the hearer's mind;
- terminology pertaining to the theory of discourse structure (Büring 2000, etc.):
  - ***Question Under Discussion*, or *QUD*:** some explicit or implicit question which each discourse utterance addresses;
  - ***Discourse Tree*, or *D-Tree*:** discourse structure viewed as a hierarchy of semantically related questions, or *Super-* and *Sub-Questions*.

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category of “neutral information” or “[*-theme*; *-rheme*]” in other classifications), I find notation [<sub>±K/±Rh ...</sub>] and [<sub>-K/-Rh ...</sub>] adequate for my purposes.