conceptualization of Foot’s leadership. Here, it is possible to see how the text producer has assumed from the outset that a particular proposition is true (that Foot is an unfit leader). At the same time, this strategy encodes the Daily Mail’s Conservative and anti-Socialist ideology through the use of the presupposition.

Media texts also frequently encode implications. These have a similar social function to the use of presuppositions, in that implications are further evidence of media discourse reflecting and enacting social practices, as well as encoding ideological stance.

(3) By any standard, the new Ministers look an impressive team. But is Mr Wilson playing them in the right positions?

(Editorial 1974, Daily Mail)

One such example can be found in (3), where the use of the lexical perception verb ‘to look’ encodes the implication that although the Cabinet appears impressive, it is not necessarily the case. Reinforced by the rhetorical question that follows, this has the function of encoding a negative stance towards ‘Mr Wilson’, the then prime minister, which serves to subtly suggest to readers that Wilson has made poor decisions.

(4) It is a relief that, as Foreign Secretary, the wily and pragmatic Jim Callaghan will take charge of Common Market negotiations.

(Editorial 1974, Daily Mail)

Similarly, in (4) from the same text, the main clause “It is a relief”, through the use of the noun ‘relief’, contains the implication that it was expected that Wilson would make a less sensible choice when selecting a Cabinet member. This again highlights one of the social functions of the text as being to reflect a negative orientation towards Wilson and therefore to enact an anti-Labour Party ideology.

(5) Can Mr Callaghan seriously present himself in the role of the man who is to stand up to the unions and operate the squeeze?

(Editorial 1978, Daily Telegraph)

The use of questions, rhetorical or otherwise, in media discourse can also often contain implications. In (5), the use of a question encodes the implication that the then prime minister Jim Callaghan would want to ‘stand up to the unions and operate the squeeze’. This suggests to readers that ‘standing up to unions’ is a positive thing to do, and encodes a right-wing ideology, or at least an anti-union perspective. In identifying the implications in questions such as this, media discourse analysts can further highlight how texts contain ideological stances and serve to enact or reflect those ideologies.

In all the examples given, application of pragmatic concepts allows for a greater understanding of the social function of the media texts being analyzed. By uncovering encoded presuppositions and implications, the analyst can highlight further how media texts are examples of language as a form of social practice and how they enact or reflect ideological stances.

DEAN HARDMAN

See also: Discourse; discourse analysis; political discourse; power; presupposition; proposition; rhetorical questions

Suggestions for further reading


Metaphor

Metaphor appears to be a paradigmatically pragmatic phenomenon. It involves a gap between the conventional meaning of words and their occasion-specific use, of precisely the kind that motivates distinguishing pragmatics from semantics. This assumption is so widespread that it has received little explicit justification, but at least two obvious considerations can be offered in its support. First, metaphorical interpretation is importantly parasitic on literal meaning. If a hearer doesn’t know the literal meanings of the relevant expressions, she will only accidentally succeed in interpreting an utterance metaphorically. In children, the general ability to comprehend
and to knowingly produce metaphors (especially those based on abstract similarities) develops later than the capacity for literal speech (Vosniadou 1987). Moreover, various cognitive and brain disorders, such as autism (Happé 1995), schizophrenia (Langdon et al. 2002b), and lesions in the right hemisphere (Brownell et al. 1990) significantly impair metaphorical comprehension, while there are no converse cases of impairment in literal comprehension with preserved capacity to interpret metaphors. Second, metaphorical interpretation depends not just on knowledge of the conventional meanings of the words uttered and their mode of combination, but also on substantive and wide-ranging presuppositions (real or mutually pretended) about the referents of the relevant expressions. As a result, the same sentence can receive dramatically different metaphorical interpretations in distinct contexts. For instance, sentence (1):

(1) Juliet is the sun.

will be interpreted quite differently when spoken by Romeo (very crudely, as meaning Juliet is beautiful), by his friend Benvolio (Juliet is dangerous) and by his rival Paris (Juliet is the most important socialite in Verona).

Until recently, however, the basic premise that metaphor is pragmatic was closely associated with two more specific assumptions. First, metaphorical interpretation is ‘indirect’ in the sense that it is attempted only after the search for a cooperative and relevant literal interpretation fails. Second, metaphor is an instance of manner implicature (Grice 1975), akin to an utterance of (2):

(2) Miss X produced a series of notes that corresponded closely with the score of ‘Home Sweet Home’.

which is intended to convey that Miss X sang in an unusual, probably unappealing, way. Both assumptions have been the focus of recent critical attention.

The indirectness of metaphorical interpretation was challenged by Gibbs (1990, 1994), who found no difference in processing time for literal and metaphorical speech. Indeed, Glucksberg et al. (1982) found that subjects actually took longer to access the literal meaning of sentences that also had plausible metaphorical interpretations, even when they were explicitly told to focus only on literal meaning. These findings have been widely taken to support relevance theoretic and other contextualist accounts (Sperber and Wilson 1986, 1995; Beuizionihout 2001; Recanati 2001a; Carston 2002). According to these accounts, metaphorical meaning is a form of direct and explicit meaning, and hence belongs to ‘what is said’ rather than to what is implicated. However, more recent studies (Blasco and Connine 1993; Gentner and Wolff 1997; Brisard et al. 2001; Noveck et al. 2001; Giora 2002, 2003; Bowdle and Gentner 2005) suggest that unfamiliar and novel metaphors do take significantly longer to process than either literal utterances or familiar metaphors. This supports the contextualist view that metaphor forms a continuum with literal meaning. But it also threatens to undermine on-line processing as a criterion for theoretical classification, since this would divide metaphors into heterogeneous classes based on their familiarity and aptness. Instead, it seems plausible to take ‘indirectness’ as claiming that a good rational reconstruction of successful metaphorical communication will first rule out a literal interpretation as being contextually inappropriate, and also appeal to that literal meaning in determining the speaker’s intended meaning. The claim that metaphor is indirect in this sense is supported by the patterns of justification and concession that speakers engage in when they are challenged on their intended metaphorical meanings (Camp 2006).

The assimilation of metaphor to implicature is rendered problematic by at least five major differences between the two. First, contents communicated metaphorically can be felicitously reported as ‘what the speaker said’, either by echoing the speaker’s original words, or with a literal paraphrase (Beuizionihout 2001). Second, metaphorically communicated contents are available for explicit response by others. For instance, if Benvolio responded to Romeo’s utterance of (1) by saying ‘No she isn’t’, this would most naturally be construed as a response to the claim that she is beautiful (Hills 1997; Beuizionihout 2001). Third, metaphorical meanings appear not to be capable of cancellation by the speaker (Leezenberg 2001; this test is
unreliable, however; see Camp 2006 for discussion). Fourth, metaphors can serve as a ‘springboard’ for implicatures (Tsishatzidis 1994; Stern 2000). By uttering (1), Romeo implicates that he admires and wants to be with Juliet. Fifth, complete sentences can be interpreted metaphorically when embedded within larger sentences which are otherwise literal. For instance, Benvolio could respond (rather flatfootedly) to Romeo’s utterance of (1) by saying (3):

(3) If Juliet is the sun, then I guess you’ll never be satisfied with any of the other girls in Verona.

Taken together, these differences constitute a strong case against treating metaphors as implicatures. It is much less clear, though, how metaphor should be analyzed. Contextualists advocate placing metaphor within ‘what is said’ as a form of loose talk. Semanticists claim that metaphor should be treated as a contextually variable form of semantic meaning, either by adding hidden structure to the postulated logical form of the sentence uttered (Stern 2000; Leezenberg 2001), or by allowing ‘free enrichment’ or modulation of that logical form (Hills 1997). However, these same differences from implicature are also exhibited by other uses of language, most notably sarcasm and malapropisms, which are intuitively very far from ‘what is said’, let alone semantic meaning. One alternative possibility is to recognize a third pragmatic category of word-based speaker’s meaning (Camp 2006). ‘What is said’ could then be tied relatively closely to sentence meaning, as Grice (1975) originally suggested, and the class of implicatures could remain a comparatively homogeneous one.

In addition to theoretical considerations about metaphor’s place in the linguistic taxonomy, a very different topic also deserves consideration: how is metaphorical interpretation achieved? First, can any general account be offered of how hearers recognize the appropriateness of a metaphorical interpretation (the ‘detection problem’)? Relevance theorists claim that a metaphorical interpretation is automatically preferred because it is most accessible in context. While this may be true of many conversational metaphors, it is less plausible as an account of novel and especially poetic metaphors, which often require significant interpretive effort. Second, how do hearers determine the specific content that the speaker intends? There are two leading cognitive models here. Very roughly, on the category-transfer model (Glucksberg and Keysar 1993; Glucksberg et al. 1997), prominent properties associated with the metaphorical vehicle (e.g. with ‘the sun’ in (1)) are predicated of the subject (e.g. Juliet). By contrast, on the structure-mapping model (Gentner 1983; Gentner and Wolff 1997; Gentner et al. 2001), structural similarities between the concepts or schemas associated with the two terms are cultivated. Recently, the two models have begun to converge toward a hybrid view, on which more conventionalized, conversational metaphors are interpreted by transfer, and more novel metaphors are interpreted structurally (Glucksberg 2001; Bowdle and Gentner 2005). However, both views still require significant modification in order to cover the full range of cases in a psychologically plausible and computationally tractable way. This is especially true for metaphors that don’t fit the standard ‘a is F’ format, where a is literal and F is metaphorical (White 1996; Camp 2003).

**ELISABETH CAMP**

**See also:** Explicit/implicit distinction; Grice, H.P.; hyperbole; idiom; implicature; irony; literary pragmatics; neo-Grecoean pragmatics; relevance theory; rhetoric; what is said

**Suggestions for further reading**


**Metapragmatics**

The term ‘metapragmatics’ has been used in the description of a number of aspects of language in use (Caffi 1998; Verschueren 2004). The